Sovereign risk in the Eurozone debt crisis by Tzima, Spyridoula
 


































Concerns about the state of public finances in the main advanced economies have increased as 
a result of the global financial and economic crisis that started in late 2007 – 2008. The fiscal 
solvency of several euro area peripheral countries has been put under the spotlight of the market 
participants who started to believe that a sovereign default was likely to happen in an advanced 
economy member of the euro area. This thesis seeks to investigate the sovereign risk in the 
euro area countries during the period before, during and after the crisis by focusing on the 
sovereign bond and credit default swaps spreads and the factors that drive them.  
In Chapters 2, we investigate the determinants of the government bond yields and sovereign 
credit default swaps. In our analysis for the government bond yields we find that the 
macroeconomic fundamentals used in our analysis are highly significant for the periphery 
countries, while they are less or not significant at all for the core euro area countries. We also 
find evidence that during the crisis the fluctuations of the government bond yields are not only 
explained by the macroeconomic fundamentals but also explained by factors related to the 
uncertainty in the euro area.  
In Chapter 3, we employ the panel cointegration approach in order to investigate the 
macroeconomic and financial indicators that impacted the sovereign credit default swaps in the 
crisis period using data from October 2008 until December 2014. We provide fresh evidence 
that the financial indicators, proxied by the iTraxx index as well as liquidity indicators, proxied 
by the bid-ask had a dominant role in explaining the CDS in almost all countries. 
In Chapter 4, in regard to the study of the price discovery relationship between the government 
bond yields and sovereign CDS, we suggest the use of cointegration methodology and also test 
for a structural break using the Gregory and Hanson approach to investigate the linkages 
between the two instruments. The structural break test suggests that the relation changed during 
the crisis and that the price discovery took place in the CDS market.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, we investigate the main factors causing the sovereign defaults. We use a 
panel of 99 countries to assess the impact that various macroeconomic and political risk 
indicators have on sovereign defaults on foreign currency bank loans, foreign currency bonds 
and local currency debt, utilizing an extended database constructed by the Bank of Canada. 
Our results suggest that the favorable economic indicators, lower debt levels, and higher 
political stability all reduce the likelihood of default. We also find that the capital outflows 
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In the last decade, many euro area countries were affected by the most severe financial crisis 
since the Great Depression. The euro area debt crisis started in Greece in late 2009 when the 
authorities admitted that its debt rose to €262bn euros from €168bn and its budget deficit was 
revised from 6 per cent to 15.8 per cent of GDP. The euro area sovereign debt crisis soon after 
that spread to the other periphery countries Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus.  
 
The crisis came on the background of a period of stability and convergence in the sovereign 
bond market for the euro area member states that followed the introduction of the euro in 1999. 
The sovereign bond spreads, which represent the financing costs of public sector debt in the 
market, converged among the EMU countries during this period. In 1996 the Italian debt to 
GDP ratio was almost 120 per cent and the government 10-year bond yields almost 12 per cent, 
while the German bond yields were at 5.6 per cent when the public debt was at 55% of GDP. 
Ten years later in 2005 with the Italian debt at 102 per cent of GDP and the German at 67 per 
cent, the bond yields were at 3.56 and 3.35 per cent respectively. Ehrmann et al (2007) conclude 
that there is no single day after 1999 when the yields on government notes diverged 
significantly between Germany, France, Spain and Italy. Baele et al. (2004) in an early 
contribution find also convergence in the euro area bond yields. However, Manganelli and 
Wolswijk (2007) find that due to the different credit ratings of the underlying bonds, some 
heterogeneity remained between the government bond yields across countries. 
 
Following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 2008 the government bond yields 
came under pressure and started rising to unprecedented levels. The market participants became 
less inclined to keep or purchase bonds from peripheral countries, in particular Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal. On May 2010 Greece reached an agreement1 with the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank on a programme to stabilize 
                                                 




the economy and restore market confidence. The Eurogroup2 agreed to provide bilateral loans 
pooled by the European Commission for a total amount of €80 billion to be released over the 
period from May 2010 to June 2013. The financial assistance agreed by the euro area countries 
was part of a joint package with the IMF participating with additional €30 billion under a stand-
by arrangement (SBA). The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was then introduced 
as a temporary financing mechanism in the euro area. Ireland and Portugal had also to be 
supported by the EU and the IMF.3 The European Commission and the International Monetary 
Fund agreed to provide financial assistance of €85 billion to Ireland from 2011 until the end of 
2013. Portugal asked for assistance on 7 April 2011 from the EU, euro area countries and the 
IMF. An agreement was officially adopted on 17 May 2011 covering a period from 2011 until 
mid- 2014 and included a joint financing package of €78 billion, provided by the EU/EFSM, 
the EFSF and the International Monetary Fund.  
 
However, the Greek crisis was deeper than initially thought. The Greek bond yields in 2012 
reached record high levels at 20 per cent. Other euro-area government bonds- Italian and 
Spanish bonds- came also under pressure and reported severe losses. In August 2012 the 
funding cost for Italian and Spanish public debt reached almost the 600bps. In 2012 and in 
order to ease the stress in the markets, Greece and its partners agreed to the second adjustment 
programme4, which included the largest debt restructuring in the history of sovereign defaults. 
The bond swap agreed was part of the second bailout package. Unlike the first programme, the 
euro area countries agreed to a programme, which would be financed entirely by the European 
financial stability facility (EFSF). The euro area agreed to contribute €144.7 billion (to be 
provided via the EFSF) and the IMF committed to contribute €19.8 billion.  
 
                                                 
2 The Eurogroup is an informal body where the ministers of the euro area member states discuss matters relating 
to their shared responsibilities related to the euro (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/eurogroup/)           








Nearly 97 per cent of privately held Greek bonds (about 197 billion euros) participated in the 
exchange of the Greek government bonds. They took a 53.5 per cent cut of the face value of 
the bond, reducing the Greek debt by around 107 billion euros. Following this event the Greek 
government activated the collective action clauses (CACs) to force the remaining bondholders 
to participate. As a result the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) ruled 
that a credit event occurred and subsequently that triggered CDS payment to investors.  
 
The Credit Default Swaps – introduced in the 1990s – are credit derivatives, which are used as 
a hedge or insurance against the risk of default on debt by governments, banks or non-financial 
corporations. In order to understand how the sovereign credit default swaps work we will give 
an example similar to the one given by Berg and Streitz (2012). Consider two market 
participants X and Y that want to trade the Z country’s CDS. X will buy 100 million euros 
protection from Y. The gross notional amount outstanding is now 100 million euros, which is 
equivalent to the gross amount. Y now also buys 100 million euros protection from X. That 
makes the gross notional amount outstanding to 200 million euros, but the net notional 
outstanding amount is now zero, because both contracts cancel each other out. The sovereign 
CDS were a small part of the sovereign debt market until 2008. The interest in them has been 
growing rapidly since the beginning of the global financial crisis.  
 
The increasing importance given into the sovereign credit default swaps at the beginning of the 
European debt crisis led the European authorities to propose specific regulations aiming to 
increase transparency and reduce risks to the stability of sovereign debt markets by banning 
uncovered, or “naked” purchases of sovereign credit defaults swaps of European member 
States, when there is no offsetting position in the underlying debt. Overall, the regulations were 
aiming to address the three main risks of short selling, namely the lack of transparency of the 
short selling, the risk of negative price spirals and the risks of settlement failure associated with 
uncovered or naked short selling.5 Taking into consideration similar concerns the European 
Commission Regulation also proposed the ban of the naked sovereign CDS. According to the 
European Authorities the naked CDS can destabilize the markets in a similar way to short 
selling. The uncovered or naked CDS refers to the case where a buyer acquires the CDS not to 
                                                 
5 Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-713_en.htm  
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hedge against the risk of default or the risk of a decline of the value of the sovereign debt but 
for speculative reasons.  
 
This thesis collects three empirical chapters investigating the sovereign risk dynamics during 
the financial and economic crisis in euro area. 
Chapter 2 attempts to shed light on the factors driving the rising EMU bond spreads during the 
Euro area debt crisis. Existing studies on EMU spreads and their spreads against Germany are 
covering both the period prior and after the global financial crisis which started in August 2007. 
A common practice followed in the majority of the literature entails focusing on three variables 
when investigating the movements of the government bond yields. First, a common 
international risk factor: Codogno et al (2003), Longstaff et al. (2007), Manganelli and 
Wolswijk (2009), Favero et al. (2010), proxied this by the spreads of US corporate bonds over 
Treasury bonds. Second, the credit risk, which aims to capture the risk that investors assume 
by holding sovereign bonds in the likelihood of partial or total default of the country and is 
measured by past macroeconomic performance. Third, the liquidity risk whose significance 
has shrunk with the introduction of the common currency in the Euro area is also investigated 
widely in the literature with mixed results. Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004) and 
Pagano and Von Thadden (2004) find limited liquidity effect on government bond spreads, 
while others Beber at al. (2009) and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) argue that the liquidity 
premia is a significant factor in explaining the EMU government bond yields. This chapter 
attempts to address the question to which extent the bond pricing reflects the economic 
fundamentals in an appropriate manner. We examine the determinants of the sovereign spreads 
of ten euro area countries – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – relative to a safe haven government bond (German bonds). 
We find evidence that the macroeconomic fundamentals used in the analysis, namely debt to 
GDP ratio, fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, unemployment rate and real GDP growth 
are significant in explaining the sovereign bond spreads. A contribution of this paper is the 
attempt to capture the effect that the Outright Monetary Transaction programme announcement 
had on the sovereign yields and also other various events that occurred during the sovereign 
debt crisis. We also find a significant relation between the euro area bond yields and the 
political risk indicator as proxied by the World Governance Indicators. 
 
As mentioned above the interest in the sovereign credit default swaps increased rapidly with 
the outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In the third chapter, we investigate the 
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fundamental factors that drove the sovereign CDS in the EMU members during the crisis 
period. Several studies monitor the market perception of sovereign risk by focusing on the 
information contain in the CDS spreads (Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen and Singleton, 2011). 
According to these studies the CDS spreads are more accurate in measuring the credit default 
risk than the government bond spreads. During the euro area debt crisis, the sovereign CDS 
were subject to large fluctuations. In our analysis, we investigate whether a long run 
relationship exists between the sovereign credit default swaps of Eurozone crisis and the debt-
to-GDP ratio, real GDP growth rates, bid-ask spreads and the iTraxx index. We employ a time 
series and panel integration and cointegration analysis for eight Eurozone countries using 
monthly data from October 2008 until December 2014. The long run relationship is estimated 
using dynamic OLS and fully modified OLS. Our findings support the existence of a long-run 
relationship between the sovereign credit default swaps and the macroeconomic and financial 
indicators used in our analysis. 
 
The global financial crisis that started in August 2007 has had an unprecedented impact on the 
euro area government bond yield markets. In the fourth chapter, we attempt to ascertain the 
pattern of information transmission between the CDS and the corresponding bond markets. In 
this study, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the sovereign CDS 
market and the sovereign bond market over the period 2008 to 2015 across 9 euro area 
countries. We use the Johansen’s (1988) multivariate cointegrated method to test the 
cointegration relation between the CDS and bond spreads. However, the macroeconomic series 
could be affected by exogenous shocks due to various economic events. Therefore, we test for 
changes in the regime between the CDS and bond spreads during the period of the financial 
crisis by using two kinds of structural break tests, Hansen (1992) and Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) tests. The results indicate that the CDS premia and sovereign bond spreads are related 
to a certain relationship and that during the financial crisis, price discovery takes place in the 
CDS market. 
 
The fifth chapter explores the determinant factors of the sovereign defaults. Using an extended 
sovereign defaults database constructed by the Bank of Canada we attempt to capture the 
macroeconomic factors causing the sovereign defaults in sample of 99 countries. The 
contribution of our research is the introduction to the model of four indicators, which capture 
the political risk and the impact that the political uncertainty has on a country’s ability to repay 
its debts. The political indicators used are the International Country Risk Index (ICRG), the 
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Polity IV, the World Governance Indicators and economic freedom index. Similar to 
Hatchondo et al. (2007) we find that the political stability, as measured by higher level of 
democracy and freedom, together with consistent political regimes lowers the probability of 
default. We also find evidence that the capital control restrictions on outflows are positively 
associated with the sovereign default probability, when combined with high indebtedness and 
volatility. 



































































Abstract: The aim of this paper is to assess the determinants of the long-term government 
bond spreads in the euro area. We employ a panel of ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) over the period 2002 Q1 until 2013 
Q3. We assess the role of an extended set of potential spreads’ determinants, namely 
macroeconomic, fiscal and political indicators. The main contribution of this research paper to 
the existing literature is that it investigates not only the impact of the announcement of the 
Outright Monetary Transactions by the European Central Bank on the government spreads, but 
also the importance of the institutional performance on the sovereign risk. Moreover, we 
explore whether the financial assistance programmes provided to three euro area countries – 



























The last four years have been years of turbulence for the European Monetary Union. For the 
first time since its introduction, the common currency has been under question. The economies 
of the periphery have been placed under pressure and are still struggling to return their 
macroeconomic fundamentals and public finances back to stable ground. After an 18-month 
period of recession, the euro area real GDP increased by 0.3 per cent in the second quarter of 
2013 followed by an increase of 0.1 per cent in the third quarter as announced by the Statistical 
Office of the European Union. Euro area has experienced the worst crisis since its introduction 
and its viability is being still questioned. The beginning of the crisis was signalized by the rapid 
increases of the government bond yields of Greece, followed by Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and 
Italians spreads. After several creditworthiness downgrades and strong austerity measures 
passed by the countries’ parliaments, bailout packages were approved for Greece (1st bailout 
package in May 2010 and the second bailout package in March 2012), Ireland (November 
2010), Portugal (April 2011), Cyprus (June 2012)  and Spain (July 2012)6. 
 
The government spreads fluctuations reflect the changes in market perceptions. The weak 
macroeconomic fundamentals raised the market participants’ concerns about the countries’ 
ability to finance their debts and pay their obligations to the creditors. The markets’ concerns 
reflected the enormously high levels of financing costs (measured by the difference between a 
country’s financing cost and the perceived ‘risk-free’ benchmark rate i.e. the German bund of 
comparable maturity, the 10- year government bond issues). The purpose of this analysis is to 
identify the determinants of the 10 - year government bond yield differentials. In our analysis, 
several macroeconomic variables as well as a number of events that took place during the euro 
                                                 
6 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro-0/euro-area/financial-assistance-euro-area-
countries_en 
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area crisis are taken into consideration in order to investigate the drivers of the government 
bond yields.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief timeline of 
the euro area crisis and the related literature on the determinants of euro area and global 
sovereign spreads; section three presents and discusses the methodology, the dataset and the 
empirical results and finally section four concludes.  
 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
2.2.1   Euro Area 
 
The European Council took the decision on the creation of the single currency among European 
Union members in the Dutch city of Maastricht7 in December 1991. The aim of the common 
currency was to strengthen the European Union and make it more competitive and stable both 
as a whole and for each individual member. As it is described by the European Commission, 
the aim of the European Monetary Union is to support sustainable economic growth and high 
employment for the member states. The main economic activity of the common currency is the 
implementation of an effective monetary policy in order for price stability to be accomplished. 
The European Central Bank is responsible to control money supply and the interest rates. The 
Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 1992 by the members of the European Community 
and led to creation of euro. It imposes an obligation on the members to abide by particular 
fiscal rules described in the Treaty: the member states have to keep sound fiscal policies, with 
debt up to 60 per cent of GDP and deficit not above 3 per cent of GDP, and price stability as 
expressed by inflation not more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three best 
performing countries and long term interest rates should not be more than 2 percentage points 
above the rate of the three best performing member states. Finally, the exchange rate stability 
should be secured by the participation of each member state in the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERMII) under the European Monetary System for two consecutive years without severe 
tensions. As also stated by the European Commission “the framework under which the euro is 
                                                 
7 Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/25_years_maastricht.en.html 
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managed underpins its stability, contributes to low inflation and encourages sound public 
finances”. 
 
When the euro was launched on January 1 1999, eleven countries joined the new currency, 
namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain, followed by Greece in 2001. First, the euro was introduced as an accounting 
currency, then, on 1 January 2002, the new currency was circulated in physical form, as 
banknotes and coins. Among the eleven countries that first adopted the euro, eight had 
government debt to GDP ratio above 60 per cent, violating the convergence criteria. Italy at 
that time reported figures for the debt to GDP ratio almost double the convergence criterion.  
When Greece joined the euro in 2001 many market participants were worried about this 
decision: they had doubts whether Greece was sufficiently prepared to join the common 
currency. On November 2004 Eurostat published a report with revised data for the Greek 
government debt and deficit. According to the report the government deficit for 2003 was 
revised to 4.6 from 1.7 per cent of GDP. The deficit figures from years 2000, 2001 and 2002 
were also revised upwards by approximately two percentage points of GDP. The government 
debt figures, furthermore, were revised by more than 7 percentage points. It is noteworthy that 
according to Eurostat report on 22 November 2004 on the revision of the Greek government 
deficit and debt figures “the reliability of Greek deficit and debt statistics has been the object 
of particular attention by Eurostat in the past. Statistical issues in this field were debated with 
the Greek statistical authorities far more frequently than with any other Member State.” 
 
2.2.2  Euro area debt crisis 
 
At this point it would be useful to present a timeline of the crisis and discuss the main cause of 
the euro area debt crisis. A great importance has been placed on the issue of the sovereign bond 
yields when the yield spreads started rising significantly in September of 2007. The collapse 
of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, the fourth largest investment bank, marked the 
beginning of the global financial crisis with enormous consequences for the global economy. 
At this point it would be useful to make a brief mention on the causes and consequences of the 
global financial crisis.  After the collapse of the technology stock bubble the Federal Reserve 
Bank and other central banks adopted low interest rate policies (Adrian and Shin (2009), 
Brunnermeier (2009), Greenlaw et al. (2008), and Taylor (2008)). Moreover, the large 
disparities between savings and investment in China (surplus) and in the United States (deficit) 
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caused large differences between exports and imports so that the large current account 
surpluses were accumulating in China and large deficits in America. McKibbin and Stoeckel, 
2009 mention the key events that led to the global recession: 
• First, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The  Asian economies generated large 
current account surpluses that had to be invested offshore to keep their nominal 
exchange rates low. As a result the capital flowed out of Asia into US technology stocks 
driving up equity prices. 
• The technology stock bubble. 
• The US Federal Reserve eased the monetary policy in 2001 in a series of steps until 
2004. 
• The above factors led to a dramatic increase in house prices in the US and several 
European countries such as Spain and Ireland. 
• The monetary authorities had to tighten policy from mid-2004 to June 2006 due to the 
rising prices and inflation. 
According to Schwartz (2008) there are three main factors contributing to the financial crisis 
in 2008. First of all the expansive Monetary Policy followed by the FED, which led to the asset 
price bubble. Secondly, the complexity of the investment instruments that were adopted. The 
rating agencies without having a formula to price the securities, examined them, as if they were 
ordinary corporate bonds underestimating the complexity of these securities and 
underestimated the underlying risk. And finally, a third factor that led to the financial crisis in 
2008 was the collapse of the market for some financial instruments. The consequences of the 
recession in the global economy were severe. Swagel (2010) mention some of the 
consequences such as massive job losses, increasing unemployment rate, reduced wages and a 
huge number of foreclosures around the United States of America.  
 
Although the financial crisis erupted in the US, it served to reveal the structural weaknesses of 
the euro area. When the crisis first started in Greece in 2010, the leading Eurozone countries 
seemed not to understand the severity of the problem. The lack of political integration made 
the euro area more vulnerable than ever. Furthermore, the lack of a liquidity crisis management 
mechanism meant that speculative attacks by the markets could not be prevented (Soares 
(2012)). The market participants priced the differences among the eurozone countries and as a 
result interest rates on sovereign debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy began to 
rise.  The Greek economy, which was more closed than other peripheral Eurozone countries, 
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seemed at the beginning of the global financial crisis not be influenced much. In 2008 Greece’s 
real GDP had growth was 1.3 per cent when the Eurozone as a whole reported 0.4 per cent. 
 
However, the severity of the crisis made it obvious that the weakest link of the Eurozone would 
soon start to experience severe financial difficulties. Hardouvelis (2011) presents a descriptive 
analysis of the chronicle of the global financial crisis and the consequent Greek and euro area 
debt crisis. According to his account, in the first half of 2009 the markets did not seem to take 
into account the fiscal and current account imbalances of the Greek economy.  
 
However, the national elections in October 2009 revealed the depth of the problem. The Greek 
Minister of Finance presented the revised data regarding the deficit and debt. In 2010, the 
revised statistical data by the European Statistical Agency confirmed the extreme imbalances 
in Greek public finances. Both deficit and debt were revised upwards, increasing the concern 
that the country would soon lose access to private capital markets and seek international 
assistance.  
 
According to Eurostat8, “the revision in the Greek government debt statistics are due to two 
different but in some instances linked set of problems: problems related to statistical 
weaknesses and problems related to failures of the relevant Greek institutions in a broad sense”. 
Greece’s budget deficit was revised up to 15.4 percent of GDP from 13.6 per cent and the debt 
was revised to 126.8 percent of GDP up from its April estimate of 115.1 percent after “severe 
irregularities in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) notifications of April and October 2009, 
including unreliability of data, non-respect of accounting rules, and timing of the 
notification.”(European Commission, Report on Greek Government deficit and debt statistics, 
November 2010). 
 
What caused the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area? What were the causes of the crisis in 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece? We attempt to answer these questions in the below short 
description of the structural problems each of the countries requested financial assistance had. 
 
                                                 







What went wrong in Ireland? Why one of the most developing economies in the last two 
decades, the so –called Celtic Tiger collapsed? Murphy (2000) in his analysis of economic 
growth of Ireland states that 1994 started a period marked by sustained growth in the Gross 
National Product (GNP) and significant decrease in the unemployment rate. Ireland, a country 
that traditionally was running deficits in its budget and reported very high levels of 
unemployment, transformed into one of the fastest growing economies. The Gross National 
Income (GNI) increased by 6.3 per cent in 1994, reaching 9.0 per cent in 1997 and 6.5 per cent 
in 1999. Similarly, the GDP growth rate reached the 10.7 per cent in 1997.9 
 
Starting from the mid-1990s, the Irish economy has experienced enormous improvement in its 
macroeconomic indicators. The unemployment rate fell, the productivity increased and the 
fiscal position was stronger than ever. However, starting from 2002 onwards the picture began 
to change. The collapse of the Lehman Brothers, an event that marked the beginning of the 
global crisis in 2008, changed things fundamentally in the global economy. Despite the boom 
in the Irish economy and the high levels of labour productivity the Irish economy built up 
several imbalances. The increased housing demand due to the growing population and the 
rising disposable income contributed to the property boom becoming a bubble (O’Sullivan and 
Kennedy, 2010).  
 
The results were devastating with the general government deficit growing to reach 32 percent 
of GDP in 2010, after the rescue of the banking system. Lane (2011) summarizes the causes of 
the Irish crisis as the boom in the property market, which was financed by the Irish banking 
system, the decline in the property prices and the dramatic fall of the construction activity. This 
has resulted in huge losses for the banking system and caused a deep fiscal deterioration. 
 
                                                 
9 For most countries, it makes little difference whether one uses GDP or GNP. For Ireland, the post-1994 period 
was characterized by large inflows of foreign direct investment, which has led to GDP exceeding GNP by a 
significant margin.  
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In November 2010 borrowing cost for Ireland reached approximately 9 percent. It was clear 
that the international bond market lost the confidence that the country would be able to fulfill 
its obligations to repay its debts. On 29 November 2010, the Irish government requested 
assistance from the EU/IMF mechanism being unable to borrow in order to finance its deficits.  
The aid package totaling €85 billion (including a 17.5 billion contribution from Irish sources) 





Portugal is the third member of the eurozone to receive an aid package after Greece and Ireland. 
What are the problems of the Portuguese economy that led the country to the rescue 
mechanism? Andrade and Duarte (2011) in their study of the Portuguese financial distress 
present the main problems of the economy. Stagnation in output, low productivity, loss of 
competitiveness and high unemployment rate can in short describe the main issues of the 
Portuguese economy. 
 
On 16 May 2011, the European authorities approved a 78$ billion bailout package to Portugal. 
The European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility 
and the International Monetary Fund are equally involved to the bailout loan. The Portuguese 





Ortega and Penalosa (2012) stress that understanding the collapse in housing investment is a 
significant factor of understanding the fundamentals of the crisis is Spain. The international 
economic crisis started in 2008 highlighted the imbalances of the Spanish economy caused 
mainly by the disproportional construction activity. Carballo-Cruz (2011) mentions that the 
excessive exposure of the banking industry to the property and construction sectors had the 
result that the crisis in Spain turned into a banking crisis.  
 
The Spanish 10-year government bond yields reached 7.27 per cent in July 2012, however the 
financial collapse was avoided. On 28 November 2012 a rescue plan for three major Spanish 
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banks (Bankia, NCG Banco and Catalunya Banc) has been approved.  Another major problem 
for Spain was the unemployment rate, which increased enormously after 2007 and in March 
2012 reached 24.4%. Regarding the youth unemployment, 50 per cent of labour force under 25 
are jobless. This could be explained by the dependence in the construction sector, which 





The Great recession of 2008 revealed the weaknesses of the public finances of several Eurozone 
countries starting from the weakest link, Greece. The crisis that erupted in Greece revealed 
macroeconomic imbalances and structural problems of the Greek economy which remained 
hidden for several years and even decades prior to the crisis. Hardouvelis (2011) points that the 
Greek economy can be summarized in a few words: the lack of competitiveness and the 
mismanagement of the Greek public sector. Kouretas and Vlamis (2010) concur that running 
consistently widening public deficits together with declining external competitiveness played 
a decisive role in the deteriorating fiscal stance of the Greek economy. 
 
Another major problem for the Greek State is tax evasion. According to the Hellenic 
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Greek state is losing 13 billion Euros in tax 
evasion and corruption of the public administration. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 
countries and territories according to their perceived levels of public sector corruption. It is an 
aggregate indicator that combines different sources of information about corruption, making it 
possible to compare countries. According to the corruption index developed by Transparency 
International in 2012 Greece ranks 94th among 174 countries, an indication that a country is 
perceived as highly corrupt having the same levels of corruption with Colombia and Senegal. 
 
Haliasos and Vayanos (2011) in a speech they gave at the 15th Economist Roundtable with the 
Government of Greece mention that the Greek crisis is not a consequence of the global financial 
crisis, but it is due to the deeply rooted structural problems of the Greek economy. They stress 
the importance of several reforms that need to be taken towards market liberalization and 
regulatory bodies, the justice system, and stress the necessity of an increase of productivity in 
the public sector.   
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the government revenues and government expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP are presented for the years 2002 and 2009. In 2002 in Greece one can notice 
the biggest difference between the revenues and the expenditures of the government, 15.6 per 
cent, followed by Ireland with 13.9 per cent.  The government expenditures in Greece increased 
from 2002 until 2009 by approximately 20 per cent and the government revenues for the same 
period declined by about 2.1 per cent. Greece’s budget deficit in 2009 reached 15.4 per cent as 
a percentage of GDP, the highest in the eurozone. The general government gross debt as a 
percentage of GDP amounted to 127.1 per cent in 2009 and 142.7 per cent in 2010 increased 
by 15.6 per cent, something that raised the concerns that the country will not be able to finance 
its debt.  
 
On May 2010, the eurozone countries and IMF agreed on a €110 billion aid package for Greece. 
In exchange, Greece agreed to implement austerity measures to achieve fiscal consolidation. 
The austerity plan had taken the aim to decrease Greece's public deficit to less than 3 per cent 
of GDP by 2014. However, the difficulties with the implementation of the Economic 
Adjustment Programme resulted to a new bailout loan on 14 March 2012. In total, according 
to the European Commission, the second programme reached 164.5 billion until the end of 
2014. Furthermore, the involvement of the private sector (PSI) was agreed aiming to increase 











Figure 2. 1 General Government Revenues and Expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 2002. 
 

























2.2.3    Theory  
 
During the euro area crisis as well as during the global financial crisis we observed the 
government bond yields to widen radically. This had as a result to trigger the interest in the 
investigation of the determinants on the government bond yield spreads. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 
show the behavior of ten-year government bond yield differentials of ten Eurozone countries 
from 2002: Q1 through 2013: Q3. There are three major phases of the bond yields development. 
First, the Greek spreads began to diverge from the rest of sample in early 2010. Second, the 
Portuguese and Irish spreads started to move upwards during 2010 and the first half of 2011. 
Third, in November 2011 the yield on 10-year Italian bonds jumped to 6.37 per cent and the 
Spanish yields rose to 5.58 per cent and remained at elevated levels thereafter. Highly indebted 
countries with fiscal imbalances and unsound banking sectors were penalized the most. 
 
 
Figure 2. 3 10-Year Government Bond Yields of periphery euro area countries and Germany. 
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Figure 2. 4 10-Year Government Bond Yields of core euro area countries 
 
 
The introduction of the common currency eliminated the exchange rate risks among the 
eurozone currencies and the government bond yields converged. The difference among the 
yield spreads even in countries rated identically occurs for several reasons. Before the 
introduction of the European Monetary Union, four main factors seem to play the most 
important role in driving the yield differentials (Codogno (2003)). The first one, which is the 
exchange rate risk due to changes that can occur to the exchange rate environment, was 
eliminated after the introduction of the common currency. Another major factor that influenced 
the spreads were the different tax treatments and controls on capital movements. However, the 
previous factor was harmonized long before the monetary union. 
 
Credit risk is one of the determinants of the government bond yields. It captures the capability 
of a country to pay its obligation against its creditors. It depends crucially on whether a 
country’s debt is sustainable enough in order for the debtor to fulfill the loan obligation. The 
final major factor is the liquidity risk, which is defined as the difficulty an asset or security to 
be traded in a time period in order to prevent losses. Regarding the spreads liquidity relies on 
the maturity the size and the secondary bond markets. 
 
Codogno et al (2003) in their study investigate the determinants of the euro area government 











































































































significance of the international risk. Their findings, using monthly data, suggest the 
importance of the international risk factors, measured by the US swap and the corporate bond 
spreads relative to US treasury yields. They conclude that the liquidity components seem to 
play minor role as opposed to credit risk factors in explaining the euro are bonds. They find 
evidence that the impact of international risk on yield differentials in Italy, Austria and Spain 
is explained by the debt to GDP ratios relative to Germany. For all other countries, the 
international risk factors affect also the yield differentials, although independently from the 
debt to GDP ratio. 
 
Schuknecht et al (2010) look at the determinants of the government bond yield spreads 
denominated in DM/euros and US dollars relative to the benchmark, the German and the US 
government securities. Their findings suggest that the markets seem to penalize the fiscal 
imbalances more after the Lehman Brothers collapse. Their findings suggest that during the 
crisis, the bond yield differentials can still be explained by the economic fundamentals. Since 
the collapse of the Lehman Brothers the increase in the government bond yields in the European 
Monetary Union is due to the shift in the behavior of the markets which starting to discriminate 
between weak and strong fiscal performance. In a previous study, Schuknecht et al (2009) 
stress the significance of the fiscal fundamentals on the government bond spreads over a sample 
period from 1991 to the beginning of 2005 and conclude that increased government debts and 
deficits give signals to the markets with regard to the sustainability of the fiscal policy. 
 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) in a rich data set from January 1999 to April 2008 find 
evidence that there is a positive relation between euro area government bond yields and short-
term interest rates. Their empirical analysis finds that movements in the bond yield differentials 
are closely related to the level of the short-term interest rates as set by the Eurosystem. An 
increase in the short-term rates results in the bond yields widening and on the contrary, a tight 
monetary police leads to a reduction in the spreads of the government bond yields in the euro 
area. Their findings are consistent to the research findings that the investors are more willing 
to bear risks in periods of low interest rates.   
 
Bernoth et al (2006) examine the central government bonds of 14 EU countries from 1993 until 
the beginning of 2005. They use a new dataset, which includes yield-at-spreads between DM 
denominated bonds and US denominated bonds for the US government. In that way, they treat 
the Euro denominated bonds of the Eurozone countries as a foreign currency. Moreover, an 
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additional contribution of their study is that they use data from the period before and after the 
introduction of the common currency. They use three fiscal variables and conclude that the 
debt service ratio has a greater importance compared to debt to GDP and deficit to GDP ratios 
after the introduction of the EMU. In total, their results show that the sovereign bond yield 
differentials respond in a significant way to the government indebtedness in both pre and post 
crisis period.  
 
In a more resent study Bernoth and Erdogan (2010) contribute to the literature by applying to 
their research a time-varying coefficient fixed effect panel model. Using quarterly frequency 
data from 1999 until 2010 they attempt to identify to what extent the macroeconomic 
fundamentals are causing the government yield spreads or whether the spread movements are 
due to price changes. They find that the increase in government bond yields during the crisis is 
due to the three reasons: firstly, it is due to the increasing investors’ risk aversion, secondly, 
due to the deterioration in the fiscal position and, thirdly, due to the increase of the price of 
risk. They stress that at the beginning of the EMU the fiscal imbalances and the international 
risk aversion seem to have a significant impact on sovereign bond spreads. However, they 
notice that in the following years and until the Lehman Brothers collapse, the investors turn to 
more safe assets rather than paying attention to fiscal fundamentals. 
 
Geyer et al (2004) attempt to analyze the dynamics of the government bond yields of several 
eurozone countries. In their analysis, they use weekly data for short maturity yields and long 
maturity yields and find strong evidence for the presence of a global factor in explaining the 
long term yield spreads. They run several regressions in order to address the relationship 
between the government spreads and three types of variables: firstly, the variables related to 
default risk, secondly, variables that measure the credit risk in the corporate bond market and 
third variables directly related to liquidity.  They conclude that the joint variation of EMU 
spreads is explained by a set of common factors, rather than by each country’s specific factor. 
 
Attinasi et al (2009) using a panel data analysis and a dataset spanning from 31 Jul 2007 until 
25 March 2009 find, in line with the existing literature that the higher expected deficits and 
government debt among the eurozone countries have as a result higher government bond yield 
spreads. In this study, which captures the period of the global financial crisis, the findings show 
that the fiscal imbalances seem to play an important role in spreads development. In addition 
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to the government creditworthiness measures they also include in their research the impact that 
the announcements of bank rescue packages had on the government bond yield differentials. 
 
Beber et al (2009) in their study argue that credit quality and liquidity are accounted by 
investors. The sample period that they use is from April 2003 until December 2004. During 
this period, significant events took place in order for the authors to study sufficiently the 
behavior of the European fixed-income markets. They conclude that in periods of large flows, 
liquidity seems to play a significantly more important role than quality. That means that the 
investors in times of financial stress demand liquidity and not credit quality. 
 
Bellas et al (2009) aim to investigate the sovereign bond spreads for a selected number of 
emerging countries using a rich set of macroeconomic and financial stress variables. The data 
set covers 14 countries between the first quarter of 1997 until the second quarter of 2009. They 
stress that in the long run, fundamentals appear to be highly significant while in the short term 
financial fragility seems to be a more important determinant of the emerging market sovereign 
bond spreads. Bellas et al (2010) also stress the importance of other factors such as the political 
stability, corruption and the asymmetry of information. Their findings suggest that the political 
risk an important long-term determinant of sovereign bond yield differentials. 
 
Sgherri and Zoli (2009) in their research attempt to investigate the degree to which government 
bond yield spreads in the euro zone are driven by each country’s specific characteristics. A 
simple panel model of the ten-year government bond yield differentials for ten euro area 
countries is estimated over a period from January 2003 until March 2009 using monthly 
frequency data. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis it seems that solvency of the 
fiscal fundamentals affects in a greater degree the spread movements.  
 
On the same line Caceres et al (2010) conclude that before the global crisis international risk 
aversion had a significant impact on spreads while in the period that followed the crisis the 
investors turn their attention to each country specific characteristics. They investigate the 
behavior of bond spreads in four different periods: the first period of the global financial crisis 
from July 2007 until September 2008, the second period from October 2008 until March 2009, 
third period between April 2009 until September 2009 and finally the period since October 
2009.  The authors stress the importance of debt sustainability in avoiding fiscal stability 
concerns regarding the state of the economy.  
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Mody (2009) investigate the surge of sovereign bond yield differentials among the euro area 
countries. They use high-frequency data and conclude to the following: Firstly, the global 
financial instability after 2007 pushed the euro area bond spreads upwards, while the investors 
moved to “risk free” assets. Jaramillo et al (2013) shed light with their research at which degree 
the fiscal variables affect the domestic bond yields. Their findings show that in times of calm 
in global financial markets the fiscal imbalances do not seem to explain in a sufficient degree 
the movements of domestic bond yields. However, in times of turmoil in the global financial 
market the investors turn to safer assets looking in particular at the specific fiscal fundamentals 
of each country. 
 
Barrios et al (2009) in their research about the government bond yields in the euro area focus 
in particular on developments during the financial crisis started in 2007. Their findings are in 
line with the literature. They stress that international risk factors have a major impact on the 
sovereign bond yields. However, factors such as liquidity and credit risk become more 
significant during the recent financial crisis. More specifically, countries with large fiscal 
imbalances and high debts experience significantly increases in borrowing costs as expressed 
by the bond yields. 
 
Moving on Baldacci et al (2010) reexamine the effect of fiscal imbalances on the long term 
interest rates in a period spanning from 1980 until 2008 for 31 advanced and emerging 
economies. Their empirical analysis suggests that the fiscal deterioration has a significant 
impact on the long term interest rates which robust but nonlinear. They also find that the degree 
of fiscal deterioration in particular for the advanced economies, could lead to various 
differences in bond spreads movements.   
 
Favero et al (2010) construct a simple model in order to identify the relation between the yield 
differentials, fundamental risk and liquidity. They test their model based on daily bond yields 
observation in the euro area from 2002 until 2003. Their findings suggest that the aggregate 
risk factor is priced consistently, while liquidity is priced for 9 countries out of a total of 16 
countries used in the sample and that the interaction between the liquidity and risk factor is 
negative when significant.  
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In a recent paper De Santis (2012) is looking at the determinants of the government yields 
relative to the German Bund and their findings imply that three major factors affected the 
sovereign bonds in the euro area. Firstly, an aggregate risk factor, secondly the credit risk of 
each country and finally the contagion from Greece. In particular, De Santis (2012) suggests 
that downgrading in sovereign bonds of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have a significant 
effect on other sovereign bond yields. Overall, De Santis (2012) implies that the control of 
contagion and the reduction of default risk in the euro area would be a crucial factor for the 
stability in the Eurozone to the achieved.  
 
Afonso (2009) is looking at the effect of macroeconomic fundamentals and fiscal forecasts 
according to macro and fiscal estimations made by the European Commission. Using a panel 
of 14 European Union countries Afonso (2009) finds evidence that the long term government 
bond yields increase with positive growth forecasts and on the contrary decrease when higher 
deficits are anticipated. 
 
Barbosa et al (2010) stress, in line with the literature, the effect of the deteriorating 
macroeconomics in the government bond yields of euro area countries especially after the 
Lehman Brother’s collapse in September 2008. Barbosa et al (2010) note that before the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers the risk premium in financial markets was the main component 
influencing the government bond yields.  
 
 However, since September 2008 each country’s specific characteristics started to play an 
important role in the development of spreads. Kilponen et al (2012) investigate the impact of 
the monetary policy and the decision taken towards the European crisis resolution on the long-
term government bond yields. They conclude that in the short term these decisions have had a 
different impact depending on the country. According to authors’ results the Security Market 
Programme (SMP) decision had a negative effect on all the countries used in the analysis. The 
SMP is the Eurosystem programme to purchase bonds, sovereign in particular, on the 
secondary markets. The programme was launched in May 2010. 
 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) argue that the crisis is likely to be the result of the 
macroeconomic imbalances of the Greek economy and a shift in the market participants 
perception about the commitment to Greece’s EMU participation. 
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Poghosyan (2014) is looking at the long run and short run determinants of government bond 
yields in 22 advanced economies from 1980 until 2010 using panel cointegration methodology. 
In order to investigate the long run effect variables such as debt to GDP ratio and potential 
growth are being used and on the other hand the short run effects are being captured with 
variables such as inflation and short-term interest rates.  
  
Maltritz (2012) points the general idea that before 2007 even if the countries had significant 
differences in their fiscal condition the government bond yields were very similar across the 
euro area countries. Once the euro debt crisis erupted the scenic changed dramatically 
especially for the periphery countries, however the author stresses the importance that the 
decision taken by the Eurosystem had on the stability of the common currency. 
 
Adding to the government bond yields literature, Dewachter et al. (2015) using a sample of 
five Eurozone countries over the period 2005 – 2013 attempts to identify the factors driving 
the spreads. Overall, the findings show that the economic fundamentals are main drivers of the 




2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
2.3.1  Data 
 
Our dataset covers the period from 2001 Q1 until 2013 Q3. We use data for ten euro area 
countries from various sources: International Monetary Fund, European Commission and 
European Statistical Office. At this point it is vital to introduce the set of variables that are used 
in this analysis and the expected impact on the spreads based on the theoretical background. 
The charts for each variable are presented in order to observe changes among this examined 
period.  
 
Figure 2.5 and 2.6 show the spreads versus the debt-to-GDP ratio before and after the beginning 
of the crisis. We are using the same range for both figures to make them comparable.  The 
spreads are shown in the vertical axis while the debt to GDP ratio in the horizontal axis. Each 
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point represents the spread and the respective debt-to-GDP ratio in a particular quarter starting 
from 2000 up to 2008 for each country. The red line shows the trend of the spread versus the 
debt-to GDP ratio for this particular period. As it is observed from the figure 3.1 the differences 
between the debt to GDP ratios between EMU countries are not reflected in the spreads.  
 
 
       
Figure 2. 5  Sovereign bond spreads and debt to GDP ratios prior 2008. 
 
 
Moving on, the beginning of the debt crisis in the Eurozone changed things dramatically as 
observed in Figure 2.6 Large deviations from the regression line are observed fact that implies 

























Debt to GDP (%)
 40 
Figure 2. 6  Sovereign bond spreads and debt to GDP ratios since 2008. 
 
In order to capture the effect of public indebtedness on spreads we use the government debt to 
GDP ratio. A higher level of debt to GDP ratio is closely associated with greater possibility of 
default. We therefore expect the debt to GDP ratio and spreads to be positively associated. 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the debt stock levels of eleven Euro area countries in 2002 Q1 and in 
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Figure 2. 7  Government debt to GDP ratios in 2002 Q1. 
 
 
         
Figure 2. 8  Government debt to GDP ratios in 2013 Q1. 
 
 
Another variable used in the analysis is the real GDP growth rate, which is the rate of change 



















and the health of the economy. The higher the growth the lower we expect to be the long-term 
interest rates. The increasing levels of GDP growth strengthens the country’s credibility and 
the markets confidence. We expect a negative relation between the government bond yield 
differentials and the real GDP growth rate. 
 
In the graph presented below we can see the real GDP growth rates for the periphery countries 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain). Both Ireland and Greece recorded the highest rates 
GDP growth during for the period until 2008. As it can be observed all countries showed rapid 
decreases on the GDP levels with Greece in 2013 presenting recession for the sixth consecutive 
year. The crisis had also affected the core euro area countries as it is observed in Figure 2.9. 
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         Figure 2. 10  Real GDP growth rates of core euro area countries. 
 
 
Furthermore, it is also important to investigate the effect of fiscal imbalances on the yield 
differentials. Higher fiscal imbalances will lead to higher borrowing costs as a result we expect 
a positive relation between these two variables. 
 





























































































         Figure 2. 12  General Government Balance as a percentage of GDP of euro area counties in 2009. 
 
In order to measure the country’s external solvency, the net current account to GDP ratio is 
used. The higher the net current account ratio the less the economy relies on external capital 
flows. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between the two variables. 
 
Moreover, in order to capture the effect of the labor market on spreads we include the 
unemployment rate in the model. The unemployment rate is a factor, which is significantly 
related to the economic growth. The lower the unemployment the more prosperous the 











Figure 2. 13  Unemployment rates of core euro area countries. 
 
           
Figure 2. 14  Unemployment rates of periphery euro area countries. 
 
 
Finally, five dummy variables are used in this model so as to capture the impact of four major 
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on which Greece asked for the first bailout package (May 2010) and the date at which the banks 
agreed to a write off the 50 per cent of the debt was decided (October 2011), are taken into 
consideration. Another dummy variable used is the rescue package required by Ireland in 
November 2010. In May 2011, an aid package for Portugal is agreed and this significant event 
is represented by a fourth dummy variable. Finally, the date at which the Lehman Brothers 
collapsed, on September 2008, and signalized the beginning of the global financial crisis is 
considered as the fifth dummy variable in the model. 
 
    
2.3.2     Methodology  
 
The data set covers ten countries of the Eurozone (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal) and spans over the period from the first quarter of 
2002 until the second quarter of 2013 capturing the pre-crisis period as well as the crisis period. 
Panel data analysis is used for the analysis of the model. Government bond yields differentials, 
which are calculated as the difference between the yield of a 10years maturity government 
bond issue of country i in time t and the corresponding German bund of the 10year government 
bond used as the dependent variable. The government debt to GDP ratio, the GDP growth rate, 
the net current account to GDP ratio, the fiscal balance to GDP ratio and the unemployment 
rate are included as explanatory variables. Furthermore, several other forms of the model are 
presented. We use five dummy variables aiming to capture the effect of four major events 
among these years are used as the independent variables of the model. Finally, we presume that 
a changing point for the Euro zone crisis is the decision of the European Central Bank for the 
Outright Monetary Transaction. Thus, one way to test the significance of this announcement is 
to estimate the model by including the OMT as a time dummy. Below the first form of the 
model is presented. 
 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜌𝜌 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   + εt            (1)             
 
 
Where the S i, t  is the difference between the 10-year government bond yield of each of the 
countries used in the analysis against the German 10-year government bond yield. On the right-
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hand side of the equation, the Debt i,t represents the government debt-to-GDP ratio of country 
i for the period t, Growth is the real GDP growth ratio , FIS is the fiscal deficit –to GDP-ratio 
, UNE is the unemployment rate of each country and CA is the current account-to-GDP ratio. 
We use panel data analysis with fixed effects after having performed the Hausmann test, which 
showed that the random effect model is not appropriate for our analysis. We also present two 
alternative forms of equation 1 by using the Debt-to-GDP ratio in a non-linear form and as a 
difference from the German debt to GDP ratio. The form of the equation using the non-linear 
term is presented below.  
 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
 
2.4.1    Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
 
Table 2.1 below illustrates the results of the regression in three different forms. In the first 
regression, all the independent variables are significant in 1 per cent level of significant apart 
from the current account as a percentage of GDP. Starting from the debt to GDP ratio, it is 
significant and positive implying that the increase of debt levels has an effect on the 
government bond yields. The results are consistent with the existing literature. Engel and 
Hubbard (2204), Reinhart and Sack, (2000) measuring the magnitude of the effect conclude 
that an increase in the debt to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point is associated with an increase in 













   Table 2. 1  The determinants of the sovereign bond spreads 
Spreads in the Euro area  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 
     
Debt to GDP ratio 
0.0400***  
(0.0072)     
0.0263***                 
(0.0034) 
Debt to GDP ratio squared 
  
0.0004*** 
(0.0000)   
 
Debt Difference 













Current account (% GDP) 
0.0006                
(0.0016) 
-0.0001      
(0.0014) 



































470 470 470 
 
470 
No. Countries 10 10 10 10 
Period 2001Q1-2013Q3 2001Q1-2013Q3 2001Q1-2013Q3 2001Q1-2013Q3 
Note 1. The debt difference indicator is calculated by the difference between each country’s debt to GDP level 
minus the German debt to GDP ratio. 
Note 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
The real GDP growth rate is highly significant and with a negative sign confirming the inverse 
correlation with government spreads. The high levels of growth imply the prosperity of the 
economy and are reflected in the lower borrowing costs. Similar to Balduzzi, Corsetti and 
Foresi (2007) the fiscal deficit is significant and positive, showing that when the fiscal deficit 
is increasing, the government bond yields are also increasing. Furthermore, the current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP is not significant. Finally, the unemployment rate is significant 
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and has a positive sign implying that higher unemployment is a negative indicator for the 
economy and it is reflected to the borrowing costs. 
 
The second regression shows the equation with a non-linear debt to GDP indicator. All the 
variables apart from the current account balance as a percentage of GDP are significant and 
with the expected sign. The squared debt to GDP ratio is significant showing that the increases 
in debt levels have a proportionally higher effect on the government bond yield differentials. 
Moving on, we calculate the differences of the debt-to-GDP ratio of each country from the 
German debt to GDP ratio in order to capture whether or not it has an effect on the bond yield 
differentials. The results show that the deviation of the debt levels from the German debt levels 
have a positive effect on spreads implying that the higher deviation the higher the spreads are. 
All other variables, except for the current account balance, are significant and with the expected 
sign. In the final regression with include in our analysis the CBOE Volatility Index, known by 
its ticker symbol VIX to capture the effects of international risk. The VIX indicator is 
significant but not with the expected sign. 
 
 
2.4.2    The Effect of the Outright Monetary Transactions 
 
 
On 2 August 2012, the European Central Bank announced the implementation of the Outright 
Monetary Transactions Program in order to face successfully the turmoil from the Eurozone 
debt crisis. The technical features of the OMT were announced on 6 September 2012. The 
President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi described the OMT as “probably the 
most successful monetary-policy measure undertaken in recent time” (ECB Press Conference, 
6 June 2013). In the Table 2.2 below we present the equation by adding the OMT as a dummy 









    Table 2. 2  The determinants of the sovereign bond spreads and the Outright Monetary Transactions. 
Spreads in the Euro area 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Debt to GDP ratio 
0.0518***  
(0.0074)     
Debt to GDP ratio squared 
  
0.0005***  
(0.0000)   
Debt Difference 














































Observations 470 470 470 








Note 1. The debt difference indicator is calculated by the difference between each country’s debt to GDP level 
minus the German debt to GDP ratio. 
Note 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
The dummy variable representing the Outright Monetary Transactions is significant and with 
a negative sign implying that the ECB’s decision had as a result the decrease of the borrowing 
costs in the Eurozone. The graph below shows the government spreads of each country and the 
announcement of the OMT in the second quarter of 2012 depicted in a vertical red line. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio in all three forms is positive and significant, the real GDP growth rate is also 
significant with the expected negative sign, the unemployment rate is positive and highly 
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significant all three regressions as well as the fiscal deficit variable which is also positive and 
significant. The current account-to-GDP ratio is significant at 10 per cent only in equation 3. 
As it is also observed from Figure 2.15 the sovereign bond spreads are on a declining trend 
after the announcement of the OMT.  
 
  
Figure 2. 15  Sovereign Bond Yields and the introduction of the Outright Monetary Transactions. 
 
 
2.4.3    Core vs. Periphery 
 
Moving on with our analysis, we investigate whether the indicators we include in our analysis 
have a different effect on two different subgroups, the core euro area countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands) and the periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). Driven by the regression described in the previous section we also 
incorporate the impact of the Outright Monetary Transactions announcement on these two 
groups. 
 
 In Table 2.3 we present the correlation matrix between the 10-year government bond yields of 













































































































and the Netherlands show the highest corrections to each other and the lowest with the 






Table 2. 3  Correlation Matrix of Sovereign Bond Yields of euro countries. 
  Belgium Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland 
Belgium 1.00                     
Germany 0.83 1.00                   
Ireland 0.15 -0.33 1.00                 
Greece -0.38 -0.77 0.67 1.00               
Spain -0.02 -0.43 0.67 0.82 1.00             
France 0.93 0.97 -0.18 -0.63 -0.25 1.00           
Italy 0.26 -0.24 0.63 0.71 0.88 -0.02 1.00         
Netherlands 0.87 0.99 -0.27 -0.74 -0.37 0.98 -0.16 1.00       
Austria 0.93 0.96 -0.16 -0.64 -0.29 0.99 -0.04 0.98 1.00     
Portugal -0.17 -0.65 0.78 0.95 0.83 -0.48 0.80 -0.60 -0.49 1.00   
Finland 0.88 0.98 -0.25 -0.73 -0.36 0.98 -0.15 1.00 0.99 -0.59 1.00 
 















Table 2. 4  Sovereign Bond Spread Determinants of core and periphery euro area countries. 
Spreads of Core Euro area members   Spreads of Periphery Euro area members 
          
Debt-to-GDP  
0.0281*** 




Real GDP growth rate 
-0.0412*** 
(0.0084)   









Current account balance 
(%GDP) 
-0.0013*     
(0.0071)   
Current account balance 
(%GDP) 
0.0436       
(0.0430) 
Fiscal Deficit (%GDP) 
0.001         
(0.0051)   





-0.0973       











Observations 235   Observations 235 
No. Countries 5   No. Countries 5 
Period 2001Q1-2013Q3   Period 2001Q1-2013Q3 
 
 
The results of the regression show that the OMT had no effect on the core Eurozone countries, 
while on the periphery countries the OMT is highly significant at 1 per cent level of 
significance. The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP remains significant in the periphery 
countries, while it has no effect on core countries’ bond spreads. Another important finding is 
that the debt to GDP ratio is more than twice larger in the periphery compared to the core 
countries.  All the other indicators, apart from the current account balance, remain significant. 
Our results are similar to De Grauwe and Ji (2013), that the decision by the ECB in 2012 to 
support the government bond markets was a game changer. Similarly, Altavilla et al. (2014) 
argue that the OMT announcement had a significant impact on the European bond market, 




2.4.4   Did the events matter? 
 
Having tested the fundamentals, it is now useful to investigate whether or not various events 
that took place during the period of the crisis had an effect on the government bond yields. In 
January 2010, the Greek-German bond yield spreads surpassed the 300 basis points. In the 
months that followed the Greek government announced austerity measures in an effort to 
convince the markets of its ability to serve its obligations. In April 2010, the Greek Prime 
Minister requested an international aid package. At the end of the same month the Greek 
spreads surpasses 1000 basis points. On 2 May 2010, the €110 billion bailout package agreed 
with participation of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. We capture the effect of this agreement by adding a dummy variable in our 
model representing the 1st Greek bailout. Similarly, we use dummy variables for the Irish 
bailout (November 2010), the Portuguese bailout (May 2011) and the second Greek bailout 
(October 2011). 
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Table 2. 5  Determinants of the Sovereign Bond Spreads and the effect of major events in the euro area 
Spread in Eurozone countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












0.0264***            
(0.0080) 







































Current account (%GDP) 
0.0004      
(0.0016) 
0.0018      
(0.0016) 
0.0016      
(0.0016) 
0.0014       
(0.0016) 
0.001        
(0.0016) 
0.0020       
(0.0014) 
Lehman Brothers collapse 
-0.0978       
(0.2302) 
        
-1.0496*** 
(0.2628) 
1st Greek bailout   
0.9674*** 
(0.2368) 
      
1.1906*** 
(0.3978) 
Irish Bailout     
0.9902*** 
(0.2435) 
    
0.6662            
(0.4566) 




0.6332             
(04586) 
2nd Greek Bailout         
0.0525       
(0.2639) 
0.3521        
(0.4200) 
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Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 













Table 2.5 above shows the results of the regressions. Our findings suggest that the Lehman 
Brothers collapse dummy is insignificant. The macroeconomic indicators seem to have a more 
significant role in determining the borrowing costs. Moving on to the dummy variables 
representing the bailout agreements for the periphery countries of the Eurozone we observe 
that the decisions towards the rescuing of troubled countries were taken the market participants 
seemed to have discounted the fact that the exit of a member country from the euro area is now 
possible. The results show that in times of economic turmoil various events make the markets 
more vigilant and influence their perceptions in a greater degree. Apart from the 2nd Greek 
Bailout dummy all other variables are significant with a positive sign, indicating that other 
factors not reflected in the economic fundamentals drove up the bond spreads. 
 
 
2.4.5   The World Governance Indicators 
 
In this step, and in order to incorporate the political uncertainty, we include the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) adopted from the World Bank database analyzed in detail by 
Kaufmann (2012). We include in our analysis the average of the six indicators, Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. 
 
It should be expected that higher levels of the average value of the world governance indicators 
are associated with lower sovereign financing costs. The higher the composite World 
Governance Indicator is, the more stable a country is, which increases its capacity to pay its 
debts.   Thus, we expect to have a statistically significant and negative correlation with spreads. 










Table 2. 6  Determinants of the Sovereign Bond Spreads and the World Governance Indicators. 
Spread in Eurozone countries 
    
Debt to GDP ratio 
0.0307***   
(0.0069) 






Current account to GDP 
ratio 
-0.0009       
(0.0015) 
Fiscal deficit 






5.2569***    
(1.2775) 
Observations 470 




The results confirm that high quality levels of governance and stable political environment 
enhance the confidence in the country’s economy and therefore reduces the borrowing costs. 
It is also interesting to note that the coefficients of the remaining variables change little, 











This paper presented a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt market. 
The purpose of this study is to explain the sovereign government bond yields fluctuation over 
the period prior and post the euro area debt crisis. We employ a panel of ten euro area countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) 
using quarterly data over the period 2001:Q1 – 2013: Q3. In our analysis we incorporate an 
extended set of macroeconomic, fiscal, financial and political indicators to disentangle the main 
drivers of the sovereign spreads.  
 
Our empirical findings indicate that there is a strong relationship between the government bond 
yield differentials and the debt to GDP ratio. Highly indebted countries send a negative signal 
to the investors about their ability to finance the debt and make timely and full payments of 
interest and principal in the future could be disrupted. Fiscal imbalances (public deficit) also 
tend to be penalized by the market participants. The current account balance, in contrast, has 
an ambiguous effect on sovereign spreads ambiguous (Eichler and Maltritz, 2013). The 
government’s debt servicing capacity is also affected by the labor market as expressed by the 
unemployment rate, which is statistically significant and positive in all cases. The overall state 
of the economy as measured by the real GDP growth explains the country’s ability to generate 
wealth and is associated with the reduction in sovereign risk.  
 
The study also indicates that the introduction of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) 
by the European Central Bank in the third quarter of 2012 was an effective strategy in reducing 
the yields among the Euro area countries. However, this favorable effect only applies to the 
periphery countries, whereas the OMT had no measurable effect on the core Eurozone 
countries.  
 
We believe that the political risk assessment is of great importance for the market participants 
when making their investment decisions. Therefore, and to enhance the explanatory value and 
robustness of our model we incorporate the World Governance Indicators constructed by the 
World Bank as an average. Our results that lower political risk and level of corruption, stronger 
regulatory framework, and stronger institutions are associated with tighter spreads are in line 
with the literature (Baldacci, 2011). 
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Abstract: The paper examines whether a long run relationship exists between the sovereign 
credit default swaps of Eurozone countries and their debt-to-GDP ratios, GDP per Capita, bid-
ask spreads and the iTraxx Europe index. We employ a time series and panel integration and 
cointegration analysis for eight Eurozone countries using monthly data from October 2008 
until December 2014. The long run relationship is estimated using dynamic OLS and fully 
modified OLS. Our findings support the existence of a long-run relationship between the 









3.1  Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to study the determinants of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) in 
the euro area. Credit default swaps were developed by employees of Banker Trust, later bought 
by Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan, as a way to protect banks from the exposure to corporate 
loans. The collapse of the Lehman Brothers completely changed the way the market 
participants evaluate the sovereign default risk of developed countries. The volume of credit 
default swaps has increased dramatically since the beginning of the financial crisis in late 2007.  
The CDS market exploded after 2007, reaching $62.2 trillion at the end of 2007 
 
CDS spreads are generally considered in the literature as a significant metric of the default risk. 
The higher the spread the greater the risk for a country to default. The financial crisis since 
2008 has resulted in the rise of the CDS spreads in all Eurozone countries and in particular in 
the peripheral countries. In this way, the market participants showed their doubts in the 
countries’ ability to service their debt obligations. This culminated in the decision by the 
Determinations Committee for Europe of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), on March 9th 2012, that a credit event took place with respect to the Greek debt 
exchange program. This, in turn, triggered the credit default swap contracts and heightened 
attention on the debt burdens of other periphery countries: Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.  
 
This paper addresses the link between the CDS spreads and macroeconomic and financial 
fundamentals for eight euro area countries; Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. Since the credit event that took place on March 9, 2012, Greek CDS 
spreads have remained constant. Therefore, we exclude Greece from our empirical analysis. 
We first investigate, using monthly data from October 2008 to December 2014, the drivers of 
sovereign credit default swaps for each of the eight countries we include in our analysis. Our 
dependent variable is the 5-year CDS spreads. We use (country-specific) macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as the debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP per Capita, liquidity indicators such as 
the bid ask spreads, and finally the iTraxx Europe index (used as a proxy of the general risk 
perception). We use the Fully Modified OLS methodology which accounts for serial 
correlation and for endogeneity in the regressors that arises from the cointegration relationship 
(Phillips and Hansen, 1990). 
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We also perform a panel cointegration analysis to examine whether a long run relationship 
exists between the sovereign credit default swaps and the aforementioned macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Having established the presence of a long run relationship between our 
variables, we apply the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) and dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimators 
developed by Pedroni (2004).  
 
Our main finding is that the repricing of the sovereign credit default swap in the periphery 
countries is strongly linked to specific macroeconomic fundamentals and specifically to the 
debt–to–GDP ratio. In case of the core euro area countries the iTraxx index is the indicator 
with the highest significance. Our findings thus confirm the results of Heinz and Yan Sun 
(2014) who also find evidence that the sovereign CDS spreads are driven by macroeconomic 
fundamentals, liquidity factors and global investor sentiment in a sample of several European 
countries.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the CDS theory and empirical evidence 
on the euro area. In Section 3, we provide a brief review of the developments in the CDS market 
and in particular the decision of the ISDA about the CDS of the Hellenic Republic (Greek 
CDS) in 2012. Section 4 presents the description of the data and methodology used in the 
cointegration analysis for both country-by-country analysis and panel cointegration. Section 5 
presents the results linking the CSS with the macroeconomic and financial fundamentals over 














3.2 Credit Default Swaps 
 
3.2.1  Literature review 
 
The credit default swaps are the most common form of credit derivatives. The buyer of the 
contract makes payments to the seller of the swap until the maturity date of the contract. 
However, in the event that the debt issuer defaults10 the seller will pay the buyer the premium 
as well as the interest payments until the maturity date. The CDS therefore serves as insurance 
against the risk of default. The credit default swaps were originally created in the mid-90s. The 
credit derivative market has increased enormously in the recent years: after the collapse of the 
Lehman Brothers their use among financial institutions has surged dramatically. Later on, the 
cost of borrowing of sovereigns has also increased significantly.  
 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA 2014) reported that the overall 
size of the OTC derivatives market reached the amount of $710 trillion in notional outstanding 
at the end of 2013.  The bulk of this is CDS, the market value of which was $593 billion at the 
end-September 2014 in gross terms and $136 billion in net terms.  
 
The academic interest in sovereign CDS rose in line with their increasing prominence in the 
financial markets. Longstaff et al. (2011) and Pan and Sigleton (2008) investigate the 
determinants of credit risk by using the credit default swaps of a large number of developed 
and emerging countries. They show that the main drivers for the CDS spreads are global 
financial factors such as the US equity and high yield markets and treasury yields rather than 
local factors such as the exchange rate, stock returns and foreign reserves. Also their results 
suggest that the sovereign spreads are significantly related to the VIX index. Since the eruption 
of the Eurozone debt crisis in late 2009 the economists have turned their attention to the 
European CDS market.   
 
A large number of empirical literature has attempted to shed light on the sovereign risk in the 
Euro area. Alter and Schuler (2012) investigate the relationship between the sovereign risk of 
                                                 
10 According to ISDA (2003) credit events considered to be the following cases: (1) bankruptcy, (2) failure to pay, 
(3) repudiation/moratorium, (4) obligation acceleration, (5) obligation default, and (6) restructuring. 
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several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain) and the bank CDS market covering a period from June 2007 until May 2010. They 
examine the differences between the period before and after the bank bailouts. Their empirical 
evidences show that before the government rescue intervention the contagion spreads from the 
banking sector to the sovereign CDS market, whereas in the period after the intervention the 
sovereign CDS spreads largely determine the banks’ CDS series. Furthermore, the authors 
highlight the short-term impact of the financial sector shocks on the sovereign CDS spreads, 
while the impact becomes insignificant in the long-term. 
 
 Acharya et al. (2013) examine the link between the bank bailouts and sovereign credit risk. 
They investigate the period between 2007 until 2011 using European bank and sovereign credit 
swap data and conclude that there is a strong direct two-way feedback.  
 
Ejsing and Lemke (2010) study the relationship between the bank and sovereign CDS market 
for ten euro area countries for a period from January 2008 until June 2009. They find that both 
bank and CDS premia are explained in a great degree by a common factor which is the iTraxx 
index of non-financial CDS premia. They also show that after the bailout packages the 
sensitivity of sovereign risk premia has increased significantly and at the same time it led to a 
decrease in the CDS spreads of the banking sector.  
 
Dieckmann and Plank (2011) examine also the European sovereign credit default swap market 
for eighteen countries; eleven of which are members of the EMU. The data span from January 
2007 until April 2010 and their analysis shows a private-to-public risk transfer and especially 
in a larger degree in the EMU countries that show more sensitivity to the state of the financial 
system compared to the non-EMU countries. 
 
One strand of the empirical literature examines the relationship between the sovereign CDS 
market and the economic fundamentals. Amato (2005), covering the period 2002-2005, 
estimates the measures of risk premia and risk aversion in credit markets. He finds evidence 
that both are related to macroeconomic factors such as the real interest rate gap as a monetary 
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policy indicator and other technical market factors such as the global funded and unfunded 
synthetic CDO11 issuance.  
 
Cecchetti et al. (2010) stress the dramatically increased public debt levels for advanced 
economies.  They use CDS data from several advanced economies and find that there is 
correlation between countries with substantial heterogeneity, implying that there are also other 
factors with similar importance.    
 
Berndt and Obreja (2010) state that approximately half of the variation in the European CDS 
market is explained by the “economic catastrophe risk” which increased significantly. Parker 
et al. (2005) find that contractual terms matter in the pricing of the CDS spreads. However, 
they also note the important role that the regional factors play in CDS pricing.  
 
Remolona et al. (2007), using 5-year CDS market data of 24 emerging markets from the regions 
of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East and Africa, find 
evidence that the sovereign risk and risk premia are driven by different factors. Country specific 
fundamentals are the drivers of the sovereign risk while global investors’ risk aversion drives 
time variation in the risk premia. 
 
Aizenmann et al. (2011) investigate the determinants of the sovereign credit default swaps for 
several countries over the period from 2005 until 2010, focusing on five European periphery 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and emphasizing in particular the fiscal 
space (debt/tax, deficit/tax) and other economic fundamentals. They find evidence that the 
fiscal space and other economic determinants such as inflation, external debt-to GDP ratio, 
trade (%GDP), and real GDP growth are both statistically and economically significant over 
the examined period. They also show that the default risk for the periphery Eurozone countries 
is priced much higher than for other countries with similar economic fundamentals. This is 
explained mostly by the negative expectations of the markets. 
 
 The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (April 2013) is an extended analysis about the 
sovereign CDS spreads in a wide range of countries. They use macroeconomics variables such 
                                                 
11 CDO is the collateralized debt obligation is a type of structured asset-backed security (ABS)  
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as debt-to-GDP ratio, real GDP growth rates and international reserves, market microstructure 
indicators such as bid-ask spreads and global variables such as the VIX index. 
 
There is also evidence that CDS spreads may also be driven by credit rating announcements. 
Micu et al. (2006) using daily data on CDS spreads and rating announcements covering a period 
from 1 January 2001 to 31 March 2005 show that all types of rating announcements (outlooks, 
reviews and rating changes), whether they are positive or negative, influence significantly the 
CDS prices.  
 
A more recent paper by Ismailescu (2010) examines the impact of the changes in emerging 
economies’ creditworthiness. The find that positive announcement have a direct impact on 
sovereign CDS prices while negative credit rating announcements have no impact. This may 
be due to the reason that the anticipation of a negative credit rating effect may have already 
been absorbed by the CDS markets before the announcement.   
 
Dooley and Hutchison (2009) find also evidence that US financial and real news disperse to 
emerging markets over a period from 1 January 2007 until 19 January 2009 as expressed by 
the 5 Year CDS spreads on sovereign bonds. Fender et al. (2012) examine the determinants of 
daily spreads of emerging market sovereign credit default swaps over the period April 2002 
until December 2011.  They split the sample in two sub periods in order to compare the 
influence of domestic and international variables before and after the global financial crisis. 
They find that the global and regional factors are driving the CDS spreads in a greater degree 
than the country-specific risk factors. This is clearer in the period of the financial crisis where 
the international variables are more important for the determination of CDS spreads. During 
the same period the country-specific risk factors become economically insignificant.  
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the CDS premia. In order to identify 
the driving forces of the CDS market for periphery and core Eurozone countries we perform 
our analysis on a period spanning from October 2008, after the global financial crisis, until 
December 2014. This study thus contributes to the empirical literature by providing fresh 
evidence using sovereign CDS market data until 2014, covering the period of the Eurozone 
debt crisis.  The CDS data used in this paper are provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The contracts are denominated in US dollars with a 5-year maturity. In our research paper we 
analyse the CDS spreads for 8 Eurozone countries, 4 periphery – Portugal, Ireland, Italy and 
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Spain- and 4 core Eurozone countries, Germany, Belgium, France and Austria. We select these 
core Eurozone countries due to data availability. We exclude Greece from our analysis due to 
lack of data after the declaration of a credit event in March 2012.  
 
 
3.2.2  The Greek case 
 
A few months after the first European Union/International Monetary Fund bailout package 
valued EUR 110 billion was given to Greece in May 2010, it became clear that it would not be 
enough to ensure the final resolution of the Greek crisis. In June 2011 the EU/IMF provided a 
new financial aid package to Greece and the largest debt restructuring in the history of 
sovereigns took place with the involvement of the private sector. On 23 February 2012, private 
holders were given the possibility to exchange bonds for the new securities issued by the Greek 
government. The offer was officially launched on 24 February 2012. The Greek Ministry of 
Finance announced that holders of EUR 152 billion face amount of Greek-law bond 
(representing 85.8% of the total outstanding notional of such PSI-eligible bonds) agreed to the 
bond exchange and consented to proposed amendments to the terms of these bonds (Eurobank 
EFG, March 2012). The International Swaps and Derivatives Association announced on March 
9, 2012 that a Restructuring Credit Event had occurred with respect to the Hellenic Republic 
(Greece) under Section 4.7(a) of the ISDA 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions.  
 
As a result, the decision to trigger the Greek default insurance contracts had been taken. 
However, Coudert and Gex (2013) state that besides the fact that the Greek CDS triggered in 
March 2012, the Greek CDS settlement did not lead to a meltdown because of three main 
reasons. Firstly, the settlement involved only holder’s net positions. The gross notional amount 
of CDS was USD 69.3 billion in March 2012, while the net notional was only USD 3.2 billion. 
Secondly, the Greece’s default was anticipated and as a result the participants had already made 
provision for the expected loss. And finally, the auction procedure ensured that the recovery 
rate for the restructured bonds and the newly issued was consistent to the market prices for 
Greek sovereign bonds. Accordingly, the Greek CDS triggered in March 2012 and Greek CDS 





3.3 Methodology and Data 
    
3.3.1   Variables 
 
 
The objective of this paper is to conduct a thorough empirical examination of the relationship 
between the sovereign credit default swaps and several economic fundamentals. To investigate 
this relationship, we use the following model 
 
 




where CDSit is the CDS premium in basis points charged per annum at time t for country i, 
GDP is the ratio of the GDP per Capita in time t and that in time t-1 for country i, Debt is the 
gross debt-to-GDP ratio, BA is the bid-ask spread relative to each benchmark bond and iTraxx 
is the iTraxx Main Investment Grade index,the corporate CDS premium. Our sample comprises 
8 Eurozone countries. We use 5-year sovereign CDS default swap (CDS) spreads sourced from 
Thomson Reuter’s database due to the fact that they are most liquid and most actively traded 
CDS. We obtain the rest of the variables from several sources such as Eurostat, OECD 
database, and Bloomberg.  
 
 
• Debt to GDP ratio 
 
We use the debt to GDP ratio as a proxy for the country’s credit risk. The greater the debt a 
country has to repay, the higher the risk of default. A higher probability of default, in turn, 
should cause the credit default swaps to increase. We therefore expect a positive relationship 
between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the CDS premia.  Figure 3.1 shows the debt –to–GDP ratio 
for all countries for the starting and final year of our analysis. The ratio has increased in all 
countries, with the greatest increases observed in Ireland, Spain and Portugal. 
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Figure 3. 1  Debt to GDP ratio 
 
 
• GDP per Capita 
 
In order to understand the degree in which the growth potential affects the credit default swaps 
premia we use the GDP per capita. Positive economic growth should make it easier or a country 
to service its debt obligations. We therefore expect a negative relationship between the GDP 
per capita ratio and credit default swap premia. 
 
• Bid-ask spread 
 
We calculate the monthly average of daily observations of spread between the bid and ask 
quotations from Bloomberg. We use the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity. The larger the 
bid ask spreads for sovereign credit default swaps the higher the level of spreads for CDS. The 




The family of iTraxx indices consists of several indexes of the most liquid CDS contracts in 
Europe and Asia. We use the iTraxx Europe that consists of 125 equally weighted European 













specific. Therefore, it can also be interpreted as a proxy for Europe-wide market sentiment. 
Fontana and Scheicher (2011) stress in their analysis that although the iTraxx index has a close 
relationship with both CDS spreads and bond yield spreads, the relationship is stronger for the 
CDS than the bond yields. We expect the iTraxx variable to have a positive relationship with 
the CDS premia. Figure 3.2 show the iTraxx index from October 2008 until end of 2014. 
 
       
Figure 3. 2  iTraxx index 
 
 
Monthly 5-year CDS premia are plotted for the countries under consideration in Figure. 3.3. 
The evolution of monthly average of sovereign credit default swaps contracts for each country 
separately from October 2008 until December 2014 is presented in Figure 3.4. Observing the 
CDS spreads we can conclude that there was a significant increase in the CDS premia until 
mid-2009 because of the financial stress of the global markets that started in early 2008 but 
became more dramatic in late 2008.  
 
For the periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain) the CDS premia continued to 
move upwards also after 2009. The upward movement of the CDS spreads implies negative 
perceptions of the market participants toward the peripheral Eurozone countries. For Ireland, 
the CDS spreads were widening sharply after 2010 and started to subside in 2011 after the 
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that of Ireland however, continued to rise until 2011 before starting to move downwards in late 
2011, after the EUR 78 billion rescue package requested by the Portuguese government in the 
first half of 2011.  
 
On the other hand, the sovereign CDS remained relatively low in the case of Germany. In cases 
of France, Austria and Belgium spreads were higher than the German ones but significantly 
lower than those of the periphery countries. Significant declines in all CDS spreads are 
observed after July 2012, when the President of the European Central Bank announced the 
Outright Monetary Transactions program.   
 



































Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the series. Among the countries the highest 
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Table 3. 1  Descriptive statistics 
Portugal CDS DEBT GDP BIS ASK ITRAXX 
 Mean 5.6 91.6 10.2 0.2 4.4 
 Median 5.7 86.8 10.2 0 4.3 
 Maximum 7.1 131.3 10.2 1.2 5.4 
 Minimum 3.8 64 10.1 0 3.5 
 Std. Dev. 0.9 21 0 0.3 0.5 
 Skewness -0.1 0.4 -0.1 1.8 0.1 
 Kurtosis 2.2 1.8 1.7 5.4 2.3 
 Jarque-Bera 2.3 6.5 5.5 57.1 1.8 
 Probability 0.3 0 0.1 0 0.4 
 Sum 420 6871.5 762.8 15 327.5 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
61.9 32693.1 0 5.4 18.3 
 
Observations 
75 75 75 75 75 
 
Ireland CDS DEBT GDP BIS ASK ITRAXX 
 Mean 5.3 83.2 10.7 0.1 4.4 
 Median 5.1 77.5 10.7 0 4.3 
 Maximum 6.8 126.1 10.8 0.5 5.4 
 Minimum 3.6 40.5 10.7 0 3.5 
 Std. Dev. 0.9 24.3 0 0.1 0.5 
 Skewness 0 0.2 0.9 2.4 0.1 
 Kurtosis 2 1.8 3.3 7.4 2.3 
 Jarque-Bera 2.9 5.1 10.4 135.3 1.8 
 Probability 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.4 
 Sum 395.9 6242.3 802.4 4.7 327.5 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
56.7 43638.1 0.1 1.2 18.3 
 
Observations 




Spain CDS DEBT GDP BIS ASK ITRAXX 
 Mean 5 66.9 10.4 0 4.4 
 Median 5.1 69.3 10.4 0 4.3 
 Maximum 6.1 92.3 10.4 0.1 5.4 
 Minimum 4 37.8 10.3 0 3.5 
 Std. Dev. 0.6 13.9 0 0 0.5 
 Skewness -0.1 -0.3 0.5 1.4 0.1 
 Kurtosis 1.9 2.3 2.8 4.1 2.3 
 Jarque-Bera 4.1 2.5 3 28.6 1.8 
 Probability 0.1 0.3 0.2 0 0.4 
 Sum 375.8 5013.9 777.8 1.7 327.5 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
26.6 14237.4 0 0 18.3 
 
Observations 
75 75 75 75 75 
 
Germany CDS DEBT GDP BIS ASK ITRAXX 
 Mean 3.2 75.7 10.6 0 4.4 
 Median 3.3 77.3 10.6 0 4.3 
 Maximum 4.3 80.7 10.6 0 5.4 
 Minimum 2.2 64.8 10.5 0 3.5 
 Std. Dev. 0.5 4.1 0 0 0.5 
 Skewness 0 -1.1 -0.9 0.9 0.1 
 Kurtosis 2 3.5 2.4 3.1 2.3 
 Jarque-Bera 3 16.3 11.3 10.1 1.8 
 Probability 0.2 0 0 0 0.4 
 Sum 242.7 5681.2 795.4 0.2 327.5 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
22 1230.8 0.1 0 18.3 
 
Observations 




Belgium CDS DEBT GDP BIS ASK ITRAXX 
 Mean 4.2 103.4 10.6 0 4.4 
 Median 4.1 103.3 10.6 0 4.3 
 Maximum 5.6 109.1 10.6 0.1 5.4 
 Minimum 3.2 90.7 10.6 0 3.5 
 Std. Dev. 0.7 4.2 0 0 0.5 
 Skewness 0.3 -0.9 -1.1 2.2 0.1 
 Kurtosis 1.9 3.8 3.4 8.8 2.3 
 Jarque-Bera 5.3 11.2 17 167.4 1.8 
 Probability 0.1 0 0 0 0.4 
 Sum 316.5 7756.3 793.4 1.1 327.5 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
35.6 1328.5 0 0 18.3 
 
Observations 
75 75 75 75 75 
 
France CDS DEBT GDP BIS ASK ITRAXX 
 Mean 3.9 85.3 10.5 0 89 
 Median 3.8 85.1 10.5 0 74.2 
 Maximum 5 95.7 10.5 0 221.6 
 Minimum 2.7 67.2 10.5 0 32.1 
 Std. Dev. 0.5 7.7 0 0 45.7 
 Skewness 0.2 -0.6 -1 1.6 1 
 Kurtosis 2.5 2.6 2.5 5.4 3.3 
 Jarque-Bera 1.1 5.1 14 51.5 12.7 
 Probability 0.6 0.1 0 0 0 
 Sum 291.9 6401 787.1 0.6 6677.1 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
21.8 4397.1 0 0 154403.7 
 
Observations 




3.3.2    Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3.2  shows the correlation matrix between the sovereign CDS for the countries used in 
our analysis. Two observations can be made. First, most of the correlation coefficients are high. 
The highest correlation is observed between Spain and Italy 0.92, and between France and 
Belgium 0.96. Second, not surprisingly, countries that are similar to each other tend to have 
higher bilateral correlations. Portugal shows the highest correlation with Italy 0.87, followed 
by Spain and France 0.86 and Ireland 0.80 and the lowest with Germany and Austria 0.44 and 
0.57 respectively. Austrian CDSs show the highest correlations with Germany, Belgium and 
France. Italy presents high correlation with Spain and Portugal and low correlation with 
Germany and Austria. On the other hand, the Irish CDSs are highly correlated with those of 
Belgium and France and less correlated with those of Austria followed by the Spanish CDSs. 
 
 
Table 3. 2  Sovereign CDS correlation matrix 
  Portugal Ireland Italy Spain Germany Belgium France Austria 
Portugal 1.00               
Ireland 0.80 1.00             
Italy 0.87 0.61 1.00           
Spain 0.86 0.71 0.92 1.00         
Germany 0.44 0.67 0.47 0.43 1.00       
Belgium 0.79 0.89    0.72 0.71 0.82 1.00     
France 0.86 0.84    0.85 0.83 0.76 0.96 1.00   




3.4 Econometric Analysis 
 
3.4.1   Testing for integration - Unit root tests 
 
The first step in investigating the determinants of the sovereign CDS is to test for stationarity 
among the series. The tests for unit root are performed using Phillips and Perron (1988). In 
order to avoid serial correlation in the residuals of the Dickey Fuller tests we also use the 
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Augmented Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981): the latter uses enough lagged 
dependent variables to avoid serial correlation in the residuals. We use the Akaike Information 
Criterion for the lag selection in the ADF test and the Phillips and Perron the Newey-West 
bandwidth is applied. The null hypothesis is that the series have unit roots.  Model with a 




Table 3. 3  Phillips and Perron (1988) and ADF (1981) unit root test results at level and first difference 
  Portugal Ireland Italy Spain 
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At the levels of series both the Phillips and Perron and Augmented Dickey Fuller tests show 
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at 1% confidence level. For the first 
difference of the series on the other hand the null hypothesis is rejected.  The results indicate 
that all series are I (1) for all the countries under consideration. Once the non-stationarity of 
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the series has been confirmed, the next step is to investigate the relationship between the CDS 





3.5    Empirical Results 
 
3.5.1     Fully Modified OLS 
 
In this section, the results of the analysis are presented. The results of the fully modified OLS 
regression are shown in Table 3.5. The estimation period is October 2008 until December 2014. 
For each country, we start by reporting the full model with all explanatory variables included.  
Table 3. 4  Fully Modified OLS regression 
 CDS Ireland Spain France   
GDP per 
Capita 0.09081 0.6287* 0.3666***   
Debt/GDP 0.0149*** 0.0395*** 0.0454***   
Bid-Ask 0.5177*** 0.0733 1.1567***   
IiTraxx 1.0799*** 1.8162*** 0.5119   
Constant -1.0934 -5.3822*** 
-
5.2563***   
R-squared 0.7364 0.626 0.6769   
      
 CDS Portugal Germany Belgium Austria Italy 
GDP per 
Capita -0.2067 0.0586 0.6457*** 0.1264 -0.0558 
Debt/GDP 0.0232*** 0.0338 0.0087 0.0338 0.0818 
Bid-Ask 0.6617*** 0.2047 0.7003** -0.0012 0.0369*** 
IiTraxx -0.8029*** 0.8245*** 1.3779*** 1.2620*** 0.9437*** 
βo 6.2307*** -1.0486 -2.9854 -4.889 0.9485 




The sample includes 8 Eurozone countries that joined the Eurozone simultaneously in 1999. 
The countries used are both core and periphery Eurozone countries. As the main long-run 
determinants of sovereign credit default swaps the model includes the government debt to GDP 
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ratio (that shows the probability of default and subsequently the higher the debt the higher the 
credit default swaps), the GDP per Capita (reflecting the dynamic of the country’s economy), 
the bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity and finally the iTraxx index which represents the 
aggregate credit market developments (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010).    
Regarding the core Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany and France), starting the 
interpretation of our results with Austria the only significant variable is the iTraxx index. 
Similarly, the German CDS spreads seem to be influenced only by the iTraxx index. In case of 
Belgium the two factors affecting the sovereign credit default swaps are the bid-ask spreads 
and the iTraxx indicator.  
 
The GDP per Capita is significant but not with the expected sign. Finally, in the last of the core 
Eurozone countries used in our analysis, France, the debt-to-GDP ratio and iTraxx are both 
positive and significant in 1% significance level. Again, the real GDP growth rate is significant 
but not with the expected sign. We use the general-to-specific methodology. Overall, we could 
conclude that the iTraxx which reflects the market condition of the CDS market is highly 
significant and positive in all the core countries implying that the changes in the iTraxx index 
are incorporated into CDS spreads.  
 
On the other hand, looking at the results of the periphery countries we can observe that the 
debt-to-GDP ratio and bid-ask spreads are both positive and significant in all cases. The iTraxx 
indicator is positive and significant only in cases of Ireland and Spain. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
and the bid-ask spread are the significant variables for Italy, and after excluding the growth 
and iTraxx index the variable that remains significant is the bid ask spreads. Overall, we can 
observe that in the periphery countries the factors affecting the most the CDS spreads are the 











3.5.2     Panel Analysis 
 
3.5.2.1 Panel Integration Analysis 
 
We also attempt to investigate the long run relationship between the sovereign credit default 
swaps and macroeconomic and financial variables by means of panel unit root tests and panel 
cointegration analysis. We estimate the long run relationship by using the fully modified and 
dynamic OLS regression. Before testing for cointegration we need to check whether the 
variables in our model are stationary or non-stationary. We perform the panel unit root tests 
according to Im et al. (1997) and  Maddala and Wu (1999). The null hypothesis of a unit root 
versus the alternative hypothesis of no unit root is being tested. 
 
Im, Pesaran and Shin test (2003) uses separate unit root tests for each cross section with 
individual effect and no time trend. The test statistic is the cross-section average on individual 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. 
 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) test is based on the p-values of the individual statistic as proposed by 
Fisher (1932). Maddala and Wu (1999) and Maddala et.al (1999) find evidence that the MW 
test is more powerful than the IPS test. Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) suggest that MW test 
has an advantage compared to the IPS test which is the fact that its value does not depend on 
different lag lengths in the individual ADF regressions. 
 
The results presented in Table 3.6 show for both tests support the null hypothesis in levels for 
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Table 3. 5  Panel unit root tests 
Variables           
  Levels     First differences 
  IPS MW   IPS MW 
logCDS 0.9852 21.623   -16.895*** 183.863*** 






Bid ask -1.514 24.13   -34.137*** 2042.73*** 
logiTraxx 1.844 4.985   -18.407*** 248.15*** 
*significant in 10%; **significant in 5% and * significant in 1% 
 
 
3.5.2.2 Panel Cointegration Analysis 
 
Our next step in our analysis after having identified the order of integration is to apply the panel 
cointegration methodology. We will apply two panel cointegration methodologies, the first one 
developed by Pedroni (1999) and a more recent one developed by Westerlund (2007). 
 
 Pedroni (1999) puts forward seven statistics: four for the use in panels and three group panel 
statistics. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested against the alternative hypothesis of 
cointegration. Pedroni (1999) describes the seven statistics, “The first of the simple panel 
cointegration statistics is a type of non-parametric variance ratio statistic.  
 
The second is a panel version of a non-parametric statistic that is analogous to the familiar 
Phillips and Perron rho-statistic. The third statistic is also non-parametric and is analogous to 
the Phillips and Perron t-statistic.Finally the fourth of the simple panel cointegration statistics 
is parametric statistic which is analogous to the familiar Dickey-Fuller t-statistic. The other 
three panel cointegration statistics are based on a group mean approach. The first of these is 
analogous to the Phillips and Perron rho-statistic, and the last two are analogous to the Phillips 
and Perron t-statistic and the augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic respectively.” 
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Westerlund (2007) proposes an error correction-based test for panel data. In particular 
Westerlund (2007) “propose four new cointegration tests that are designed to test the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration by testing whether the error correction term in a conditional 
error term model is equal to zero. If the null hypothesis of no error correction is rejected, then 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration is also rejected.” Westerlund (2007) also concludes that 




3.6     Results 
 
In order to test for the long run relationship between the credit default swaps and a set of 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals we conduct firstly the panel cointegration test 
according to Pedroni (1999). Table 3.7 shows the outcome of Pedroni’s (1999) cointegration 
tests.  
 
As discussed previously Pedroni (1999) uses four within-group and three between-group tests 
to estimate whether the panel data are cointegrated. The results for the PP and ADF within 
group tests show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in 5% and 1% 
respectively. Also in the between dimension group tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
is rejected for the ADF test in 10% statistical significance level.  
 
 
Table 3. 6  Panel cointegration tests.            
Pedroni residual cointegration tests 
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration 
Included observations   600 
Cross-sections included   8 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-
dimension) 
Panel-v     -0.69 
Panel-rho     -1.03 
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Panel-PP     -1.84** 
Panel-ADF     -2.18*** 
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-
dimension) 
Group rho     0.36 
Group PP     -0.88 
Group ADF     -1.48* 




Table 3. 7  Panel cointegration tests 
Westerlund Panel Cointegration Test 
Statistic Value Z-value p-value 
Gα -3.159 -2.295 0.011 
Ga -11.418 -0.433 0.333 
Pt -6.655 -2.7 0.004 




 In Table 3.8 we present the results of the Westerlund test. According to three of the four test 
statistics we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level for the two and 
at 10% for the one of them, while one of them is insignificant.  
 
3.7     Panel Cointegration Estimator 
 
 
Having found the existence of a long run relationship between the sovereign credit default 
swaps and our variables we can proceed to test for the long-run estimators for our model. We 
perform the group-mean FMOLS and DOLS estimators which have been produced by Pedroni 
(2004). Kao, Chiang and Chen (1999) investigate the relationship between research and 
development expenditure and growth using a panel of FMOLS and DOLS estimator 
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considering the estimation methods with cointegration discussed by Kao and Chiang (1999), 
Phillips and Moon (1999) and Pedroni (1996).  
 
Kao and Chiang (1999) in their research provide a comparison between the OLS, fully 
modified OLS (FMOLS) and DOLS estimators in panel cointegration regression models. Their 
findings show that the dynamic OLS estimator is more powerful that the FMOLS estimator. In 
Table 3.9 we provide group-mean DOLS and FMOLS results for our model. In case of FMOLS 
estimator originally introduced by Pedroni (1996a) we provide the results for the group mean 
estimator.  
 
Pedroni (1996a) suggests that the group mean estimator performs better than the pooled panel 
FMOLS estimator because of the t-statistic which allows for a more flexible alternative 
hypothesis. Furthermore, Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue that the group mean estimators 
provide consistent point estimates of the sample mean of the heterogeneous cointegrating 
vectors, while the pooled FMOLS estimators do not. 
 
 
Table 3. 8  FMOLS and DOLS estimators 
DOLS Estimates   FMOLS Estimates 
Dependent variable: 
logCDS   
Dependent variable: logCDS 
      
All countries   All countries 








Bid ask 0.6874***   Bid ask 0.5731*** 
logiTraxx 0.7612***   logiTraxx 0.7421*** 
          
periphery countries   periphery countries 









Bid ask 0.7704***   Bid ask 0.6924*** 
logiTraxx 0.2693**   logiTraxx 0.3563*** 
          
core countries   core countries 








Bid ask 0.4987*   Bid ask 0.4539** 
logiTraxx 1.1177***   logiTraxx 1.1280*** 
*significance in 10%,**significance 5% and ***significance in 1% 
 
 
The results from the DOLS and FMOLS estimators are presented in three different panels of 
Table 3.9. The first panel includes all eight countries, the second includes the periphery 
Eurozone countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain) and the third one the core Eurozone 
countries (Germany, Belgium, France and Austria).  
 
The results support a positive and significant relationship between the sovereign credit default 
swaps and the debt-to-GDP ratio, bid ask spread and the iTraxx index. In case of the GDP per 
Capita the coefficient is significant but not with the expected sign.  In the case of periphery 
countries the debt-to GDP ratio, the bid ask spread and the iTraxx index are all positive and 
significant, however the GDP per Capita is insignificant. The bid ask coefficient in both 
FMOLS and DOLS methodologies is the indicator with the higher impact on the sovereign 
credit default swaps over the period 2008M08 – 2014M12 similar to Badaoui (2013) who 
argues that the liquidity risk has a significant impact on the CDS spreads.  
 
The results differentiate in the analysis of the core Eurozone counties. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
is insignificant implying that had no impact on determining the sovereign credit default swaps 
in the core Eurozone countries. The rest of the variables are all positive and significant, 
however the GDP per Capita has not the expected sign. Among the other two indicators the 
impact of the iTraxx index is found to be stronger compared to the bid ask spreads in both 
FMOLS and dynamic OLS methodologies.  
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The results indicate that the fiscal stability indicators had an impact on the CDS during the 
crisis period in the periphery countries, while in the core Eurozone countries had no impact at 
all. However, the findings suggest that the iTraxx Europe CDS index is the variable with the 
strongest predictive ability to describe variation in CDS spreads. Given that this variable is the 
only one that is measured at the Europe-wide rather than country level, this finding suggests 
that European (common) factors are the most important determinant of CDS spreads of 
European countries. This holds, rather surprisingly, for the core and periphery countries alike, 







Taking into consideration the euro debt crisis period, this paper studies the effects of long run 
debt-to-GDP, GDP per Capita, bid ask spread and iTraxx index on the credit default swaps of 
eight euro area countries.  
 
From the country-by-country analysis we can make different conclusions for the impact that 
the variables had on the sovereign credit default swaps for each euro area country. In all 
countries the iTraxx index has an impact on the CDS spreads during the crisis period except 
for Italy. In case of Portugal the iTraxx is significant but not with the expected sign. The bid 
ask spread variable is significant and positive, apart from the cases of Austria and France, 
which seem not be influenced by the bid ask spread variable which is used as a proxy for 
liquidity. The debt-to GDP ratio is significant and with the expected sign driving the German, 
French, Irish, Italian and Portuguese CDS spreads leaving the Austrian, Belgian and Spanish 
spreads unaffected. The GDP per Capita is significant and with the expected sign only in case 
of Italy. 
 
This paper also uses panel unit root and cointegration techniques in order to investigate the 
long run relationship of the CDS spreads of a panel of eight euro area countries and 
macroeconomic and financial indicators. The results indicate a strong relationship between the 
credit default swaps and the iTraxx index similar to Attinasi et al (2009), Kim et al. (2010). 
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The debt-to GDP ratio is also significant and with the expected sign when the full sample and 
the periphery euro area countries are under investigation, while in the case of the core countries 
seems to have no impact on determining the CDS spreads. Liquidity factors as proxied by the 
bid ask spreads seem also to be driving factors of the CDS spreads in all three cases examined 
(Longstaff, (2007) in the panel cointegration analysis. 
 
The results of this paper suggest that the sovereign credit risk as expressed by the CDS spreads 
is driven mostly by financial market and liquidity indicators and in a smaller degree by local 
economic fundamentals. Our empirical results advance the idea that the CDS surge during the 
Eurozone debt crisis was mainly due to market indicators as expressed by the iTraxx index and 
the bid ask spreads as a proxy for liquidity. We can also observe that the public debt 
sustainability as expressed by the debt to GDP ratio, which proxies sovereign default risk is 
explaining the CDS spreads of the periphery countries. This can be explained by the fact that 






























The relationship between Credit Default Swaps and 


























Abstract: In this study, we perform an analysis on the relation between the CDS and bond 
spreads. We use the Johansen’s (1988) multivariate cointegrated method to test the 
cointegration. In order to capture the effect of exogenous shocks due to various economic 
events, we test for changes in the regime between the CDS and bond spreads during the period 
of the financial crisis by using two kinds of structural break tests, Hansen (1992) and Gregory 
and Hansen (1996) tests. The results indicate that the CDS premia and sovereign bond spreads 
are related to a certain relationship and that during the financial crisis, price discovery takes 



























4.1  Introduction 
 
Credit default swaps (CDS) are financial contracts used as a protection by the investors against 
losses arising from credit events such as defaults or debt restructuring. The CDS purchaser 
pays fees to the seller and is compensated on the occurrence of a credit event. The CDS spreads 
are significant measures of sovereign default risk and indicators of the markets perception of 
sovereign risk.   
 
The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 stimulated the interest in the credit default swaps of 
sovereign debt. The volume of CDS was about $6 trillion at the end of 2004 and reached $58 
trillion by the end of 2007. The increasing indebtedness of several Eurozone countries attracted 
the attention of market participants and as a result the CDS spreads rose to unprecedented 
levels. In 2008 the public debt to GDP ratio of Greece, the most indebted euro area was 109.4%, 
and Italy’s debt to GDP ratio reached 102.4%. The financial crisis in 2007, which deepened in 
2008 after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, had increased the interest in the CDS market. 
 
In this study, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the sovereign 
CDS market and the sovereign bond market over the period 2008 to 2015 across 9 euro area 
countries. We use the Johansen’s (1988) multivariate cointegrated method to test the 
cointegration relation between the CDS and bond spreads. However, the macroeconomic series 
could be affected by exogenous shocks due to various economic events. Therefore, we test for 
changes in the regime between the CDS and bond spreads during the period of the financial 
crisis by using two kinds of structural break tests, Hansen (1992) and Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) tests.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss key concepts in the literature 
on CDS and bond yields relationship and the data used. The third section discusses the 
econometric method and the empirical findings of the paper are presented. Finally, the 






4.2 Bond and CDS Spreads: What Do We Know 
 
There is a large number of papers analysing the relation between the CDS and corresponding 
bond markets especially after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Delatte et al. (2011) 
investigate the relation between the CDS and bond market using the 5-year maturity CDS and 
a sample of developed European Union countries. They use panel data analysis for ten 
countries and for a period from January 2008 until 2010.   Delatte et al. (2011) find evidence 
that in periods of financial turbulences the CDS market seems to have a dominant role in the 
information transmission between the CDS and bond markets.  Moreover, in their country-
specific analysis of Belgium and Greece, they find that the CDS market dominates also is high 
yield economies.  
 
In a previous paper, Delatte et al (2010) adopt a non-linear approach and present results based 
on eleven European countries from 2008 to 2010. They show, first, that there is a nonlinear 
relation between CDS and bond spreads, second, that the CDS market leads the bond market 
in periods of economic turmoil and, third, that intense changes in CDS premia imply 
turbulences in the euro area economy. 
 
Palladini (2011) also studies the relation between the sovereign CDS spreads and the 
government bond yields using daily data from January 2004 until March 2011 for a sample of 
six euro area countries. They find evidence that the two prices are equal in the long-run 
equilibrium.  
 
Similarly, Acre et al (2012) using a sample of eleven European Monetary Union countries from 
January 2004 to October 2011 attempt to investigate whether the CDS and bond market prices 
reflect the same information. They show that there are persistent deviations between CDS and 
bond spreads during the subprime crisis but not before. 
 
Hull et al. (2004) examined the relationship between the credit default swap spread and bond 




Alexopoulou et al. (2009) analyse the pricing dynamics in two credit markets, the European 
financial and non-financial firms over the period January 2004 to October 2008. The find 
evidence of a co-integration relationship in the long-run between the CDS spreads and 
corporate bond spreads. Their findings also suggest that the European CDS markets absorb 
information faster than the corporate bond markets. 
 
Coudert and Gex (2010) in their analysis attempt to determine the links between credit default 
swaps and bonds and which is the leader in the price discovery process is. According to their 
results the CDS market leads the bond market for corporate bonds. 
 
Fontana et al (2010) use a sample of ten euro area countries and for a period from January 2006 
until June 2010. Their results show that the driving factors are similar for CDS and bond 
spreads. They also show that in the majority of countries the CDS spread exceeds the bond 
spreads except for Portugal, Ireland and Greece. They observe also that since the beginning of 
the global financial crisis there is a linkage between the CDS market and the cost of borrowing 
confirming also that the specific country characteristics have changed the market participant’s 
behaviour against the default risk of euro area economies.  
 
Ammer and Cai (2006) in their research investigate the relation between the CDS premiums 
and bond spreads in nine emerging countries using daily data from February 2001 until March 
2005. According to their findings for the majority of the countries a linear relation between the 
CDS spreads and bond spreads is observed. They find also evidence that the more liquid market 
seems to lead the other, the CDS markets lead the bond markets in some cases, while in others 
the lag bond prices lead the CDS markets. 
 
Kalbaska et al (2012) examine the long-term dynamics of the CDS market of several Eurozone 
countries for a period starting from 2005 until 2010 covering the period of the crisis. They find 
changes in the correlations of the CDS premia in the sample after August 2007, after the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers, after the sovereign risk increased in Europe in November 
2009 and shortly after the EU-IMF Greek bailout in May 2010. Their results indicate contagion 
between the Eurozone countries; however it is not possible to clearly answer the question of 
the possible next weakest link in case of default of some country. 
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Badaoui et al. (2012) using a factor model attempting to decompose the CDS spreads into 
components attributable to the risk of default, liquidity, systematic liquidity and correlation. 
Overall, their results show that liquidity has a higher impact on sovereign credit default swaps 
and that the sovereign bond yields are less influenced by liquidity factors. Finally, they 
conclude using data spanning from November 2005 to September 2010 that both CDS and 
bond spreads are subject to global liquidity shocks.  
 
Another group of studies focuses on the relationship between CDS and bond spreads in the 
corporate markets. Zhu (2004) finds that the bond spreads and CDS spreads move together in 
the long run, although in the short run the CDS market often moves ahead of the bond market 
in price discovery. Blanco et al. (2005) study the relationship between the CDS premium and 
the credit spreads using a sample of 16 US and 17 European investment grade firms. They find 
that for the majority of the companies the CDS prices are substantially higher than the credit 





In our research, we investigate whether changes CDS spreads are causing changes in the 
relevant bond yields or vice versa. The countries considered in our analysis are Belgium, 
France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain. The data consist of daily 
time series of CDS premia from November 2008 until November 2015 obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream database. The maturity of these contracts is 10 years in order to have same 
maturity as the government bond yields. For the calculation of the bond spread the difference 
between the 10 Year government bond yield of each country under consideration and the 
German 10 Year government bond yield is considered.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the CDS premia and the spreads of the 10-year government 
bond yields for all the countries in our analysis. We can observe from the graphs that both the 
government bond spreads and the credit default swaps move in the same direction. Both 
increased after the global financial crisis started in 2007 and started declining after 2009.  
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However, after the beginning of the euro area debt crisis, the CDS and bond spreads stared 
increasing dramatically again. In our graph presentation, we also present the Greek credit 
default swaps. According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, “the 
Determinations Committee determined that the invoking of the collective action clauses by 
Greece to force all holders to accept the exchange offer for existing Greek debt constituted a 
credit event under the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions”12.  As a result, after March 
9, 2012 the credit default swaps for Greece were not calculated. 
  
 
Figure 4. 1 The evolution of the CDS premia and the government bond yield differentials in all the countries under 
consideration. 
 
      
                                                 
12 According to ISDA (2003) credit events considered to be the following cases: (1) bankruptcy, (2) failure to pay, 
(3) repudiation/moratorium, (4) obligation acceleration, (5) obligation default, (6) restructuring. 
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4.4 Methodology and empirical results 
 
4.4.1    Unit root tests 
 
The first step in order to investigate the long run relationship between credit default swaps and 
government bond yield differentials is to test for stationarity. The tests for unit roots were 
performed using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis is that the series have 
a unit root, against the alternative that they do not.  The models that are used in the analysis 
include a constant term. The Akaike information criteria (AIC) is used for the determination of 
the lag length. The results of the unit root tests for the CDS and Spreads are presented in Tables 
4.1 and 4.2.  
 
Table 4. 1  Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test in levels for CDS and SPREADS. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (CDS) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
  1% 5% 10% 
France -2.1671 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Greece -0.6002 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Ireland -2.125 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Italy -1.9702 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Portugal -1.717 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Belgium -1.6876 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Finland -1.9047 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Spain -2.1748 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
      
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (SPREAD) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
  1% 5% 10% 
France -2.5452 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Greece -1.7199 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Ireland -1.5113 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Italy -1.5577 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
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Portugal -1.2131 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Belgium -2.2666 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Finland -1.7724 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 





Table 4. 2   Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test in first difference for CDS and SPREADS. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (CDS(-1)) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
  1% 5% 10% 
France -7.535502 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Greece -9.06015 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Ireland -10.36859 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Italy -8.073723 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Netherlands -7.267991 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Portugal -9.710806 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Finland -21.576 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Belgium -7.172324 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Spain -9.691945 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (SPREAD(-1)) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
  1% 5% 10% 
France -8.287181 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Greece -10.32284 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Ireland -12.41894 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Italy -7.557808 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Netherlands -10.58128 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Portugal -11.60647 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Finland -21.576 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
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Belgium -15.49297 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
Spain -15.70235 -3.4365 -2.8634 -2.5378 
 
All series contain unit root in levels according to ADF test: the null hypothesis of a unit root in 
levels cannot be rejected at 1%, 5% or 10% confidence level. However, there is no evidence of 
unit root in first differences: the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence level. The series are all are I(1) and are thus stationary in first differences.  
 
However, the conventional unit root tests, such as the Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philips 
and Perron (1989) fail to reject the unit root hypothesis when the sample under consideration 
incorporates economic events which many have caused changes in the regime. Perron (1989) 
recognising this flaw proposed allowing for a known or exogenous break in the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF ) tests. Zivot and Andrews (1992), in turn, developed a new methodology, 
which allows an endogenous structural break in the analysis. We notice from the results of 
Zivot Andrews (1992) in Table 4.3 that breakpoints occur in nearly all countries. According to 
the ZA tests, all variables are I(1) and the series are integrated of order I(1) at the 5 % level of 
significance. 
 
Table 4. 3  ZA (1992) unit root tests 
    
Variable         




CDS_BE -3.395(5) 6/11/2012 -22.193 (4)*** 11/24/2011 
CDS_AU -4.106 (6) 6/29/2011 -16.564 (5)*** 11/24/2011 
CDS_FIN -3.984 (5) 6/3/2011 -15.612 (6)*** 6/11/2012 
CDS_FR -2.905 (6) 4/8/2011 -22.115 (4)*** 11/24/2011 
CDS_IT -3.758 (6) 6/6/2011 -18.574 (6)*** 11/14/2011 
CDS_ES -3.006 (5) 3/16/2010 -23.234 (4)*** 6/15/2012 
CDS_PO -3.161 (6) 8/2/2010 -17.403 (6)*** 1/26/2012 





Variable         
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SP_BE -3.395 (5) 3/11/2011 -22.462 (4)*** 10/27/2011 
SP_AU -4.296 (6) 5/5/2011 -20.172 (5)*** 10/18/2011 
SP_FIN -4.331 (6) 4/20/2011 -21.819 (5)*** 10/27/2011 
SP_FR -5.062 (6) 5/5/2011 -18.905 (6)*** 10/18/2011 
SP_IT -3.757 (4) 3/14/2011  -18.377(6)*** 12/12/2011 
SP_ES -2.978 (4) 3/1/2013 -19.876 (6)*** 6/25/2012 
SP_PO -2.722 (4) 6/29/2010 -24.299 (3)*** 12/30/2011 
SP_IR -4.176 (6) 6/29/2010 -18.155 (6)*** 6/17/2011 
The numbers in parenthesis are the lag order based on the AIC. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4. 4 Lee and Strazicich LM Unit root test 
Lee Strazicich LM Unit root test - CDS (Levels) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
  1% 5% 10% 
France -2.9903 -4.571 -4.0432 -3.7669 
Austria -3.5168 -4.5749 -4.0478 -3.7717 
Ireland -3.4786 -4.5827 -4.0553 -3.7797 
Italy -3.0236 -4.5777 -4.0506 -3.7747 
Portugal -3.4509 -4.56 -4.0311 -3.574 
Finland -2.8298 -4.5771 -4.05 -3.7741 
Belgium -2.723 -4.5834 -4.056 -3.7804 
Spain -3.7566 -4.5757 -4.0487 -3.7726 
     
Lee Strazicich LM Unit root test  SPREADS  (Levels) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
spreads 1% 5% 10% 
France -3.8003 -4.5665 -4.0382 -3.7615 
Austria -3.5451 -4.584 -4.0566 -3.781 
Ireland -2.9054 -4.5572 -4.0285 -3.7512 
Italy -3.022 -4.5618 -4.0328 -3.7558 
Portugal -3.0811 -4.5542 -4.0257 -3.7482 
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Finland -3.0654 -4.5542 -4.0257 -3.7482 
Belgium -2.84 -4.5575 -4.0228 -3.7516 
Spain -3.0551 -4.5883 -4.0605 -3.7853 
     
     
Lee Strazicich LM Unit root test - CDS (1st Difference) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
  1% 5% 10% 
France -15.0283 -4.5613 -4.0324 -3.7663 
Austria -16.5605 -4.4641 -3.9254 -3.6491 
Ireland -13.7577 -4.5743 -4.047 -3.7709 
Italy -14.6478 -4.5154 -3.9843 -3.704 
Portugal -13.7348 -4.5876 -4.0599 -3.7846 
Finland -20.0353 -4.4584 -3.9224 -3.6426 
Belgium -14.5608 -4.5473 -4.0192 -3.7413 







   
Lee Strazicich LM Unit root test - SPREADS (1st Difference) 
  
t-statistic 
Critical t of Mackinnon (t) 
  1% 5% 10% 
France -12.3725 -4.5648 -4.0362 -3.7594 
Austria -24.1053 -4.5822 -4.0548 -3.7792 
Ireland -13.7577 -4.5742 -4.0471 -3.7709 
Italy -14.6478 -4.5154 -3.9844 -3.7041 
Portugal -12.4051 -4.5583 -4.0296 -3.7523 
Finland -14.6051 -4.4627 -3.9253 -3.6477 
Belgium -18.3855 -4.5388 -4.0101 -3.7315 




Table 4.4 and 4.5 provide the descriptive statistics for the series. Among the series the Greek 
bond spread and the Greek CDS have the highest variation followed by all the other countries. 
 
Table 4. 5  Descriptive statistics for CDS 
  CDS_AU CDS_BE CDS_FIN CDS_FR  CDS_GR CDS_IR CDS_IT CDS_PO CDS_SP 
 Mean 92.2513 121 49 99  11701 269 218 372 216 
 Median 77.75 100 44 89  1842 194 181 279 185 
 Maximum 260 386 108 262  29118 1083 551 1259 586 
 Minimum 16.25 26 15 16  60 37 49 47 46 
 Std. Dev. 48.63683 70 19 53  13565 198 115 277 121 
 Skewness 1.308777 1 1 1  0 1 1 1 1 
 Kurtosis 4.121913 4 4 3  1 3 3 3 3 
 Jarque-Bera 640.3737 552 378 270  314 325 325 365 200 
 Probability                    
 Sum 174816.2 230235 92888 187991  22173496 510337 413991 704160 409256 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
4480335 9266434 696179 5407856 
 
3.48E+11 74283625 25205352 145000000 27726462 
                     
 
Observations 
1895 1895 1895 1895 
 
1895 1895 1895 1895 1895 
 
Table 4. 6  Descriptive statistics for bond spreads 
  SP_AU SP_BE SP_FIN SP_FR SP_GR SP_IR SP_IT SP_PO SP_SP 
 Mean 0.494 0.844 0.286 0.515 9.704 2.895 2.015 4.05 2.08 
 Median 0.416 0.712 0.251 0.419 8.114 2.075 1.558 2.981 1.748 
 Maximum 1.832 3.603 1.009 1.902 38.062 11.896 5.579 15.557 6.341 
 Minimum 0.046 0.149 -0.109 0.151 0.635 0.447 0.586 0.433 0.314 
 Std. Dev. 0.293 0.557 0.151 0.285 7.76 2.244 1.153 3.198 1.289 
 Skewness 1.378 1.594 1.448 1.659 1.419 1.077 1.024 1.023 0.811 
 Kurtosis 4.907 5.611 5.595 5.569 4.639 3.33 3.059 3.036 2.856 
 Jarque-Bera 887 1341 1194 1390 849 375 331 330 209 
 Probability                   
 Sum 936 1599 542 977 18388 5487 3818 7676 3942 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 163 588 43 154 114064 9533 2519 19372 3147 
                    





4.4.2     Cointegration and causality 
 
In order to investigate the long run relationship between CDS and bond yield spreads in the 
Eurozone countries under consideration, the Johansen test is performed. In this test, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is tested against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration.  
Before that we apply the Bai and Perron (1998, 2008) procedure in order to test for multiple 
break points in our model for all the countries under investigation. 
 
 
For each country we estimate the following model: 
 
 
CDSit = a + bBYit 
 
 
CDSit and bBYit are the CDS and bond yield spreads of country i at time t. The sample period 
runs from 31 October 2008 through 19 November 2015. The novelty of our paper is that we 
consider in our analysis the period of the recent crisis in the European Monetary Union. Daily 
estimates of 10 year government bond yields and CDS quotes were obtained from DataStream. 
Data for Greece were only obtained until 22 February 2012.  
 
Table 4.6 shows trace tests and p-values of Johansen tests. The hypothesis of no cointegration 
is rejected in all cases. The basis of Johansen test is an unrestricted VAR model. The optimal 
lag length of the VAR model is selected based on information criteria such as the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and the Hannan-Quinn 
Information criterion.  However, if the VAR model is found the have serial correlation we add 







Table 4. 6  Johansen’s cointegration test (CDS-BOND SPREADS) 
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Null Hypothesis No 
co-integration 
  p value 
Null Hypothesis At 




47.45 0.0000* 2.29 0.1303 
Finland 
(k=9) 
17.95 0.0209* 5.22 0.0223* 
France 
(k=8) 
37.42 0.0000* 2.48 0.1153 
Greece 
(k=8) 
21.82 0.0049* 5.94 0.0148 
Ireland 
(k=8) 
62.63 0.0000* 1.66 0.198 
Italy (k=8) 71.71 0.0000* 1.98 0.1584 
Austria 
(k=9) 
73.35 0.0000* 4.06 0.0438* 
Portugal 
(k=5) 
71.21 0.0000* 1.31 0.2508 
Spain (k=7) 56.88 0.0000* 1.82 0.1778 
 
 
4.4.2.1 Granger Causality Test 
 
In order to have better evidence of the cointegration between the two variables we perform 
Granger Causality test. That means that if the bond yield spreads cause the CDS spreads then 
past bond yield differential values contain information that helps predict the CDS spreads.  We 
consider the following model:  
 
CDSt = a1 + a2cdst-1 + … + at-p cdst-p +b1BYt-1 + … + bt-pBYt-p + ut 
 
BYt = c1 + c2cdst-1 + … + ct-p cdst-p +d1BYt-1 + … + dt-pBYt-p + ut 
 
Where p is the lag length 
Note: *Rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level, MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values , 1 





Table 4. 7  Causality test of Granger- Long –run 
  the premia of the CDS do not 
cause the spreads of the bonds  
prob. 
the spreads of the bonds do not 
cause the premia of the CDS  
prob. 
Belgium -0.024812 0.0000*** 4.65E-05 0.2425 
Finland -0.005266 0.0006*** 6.86E-05 0.1293 
France -0.012835 0.0000*** 0.000115 0.0005*** 
Greece -0.002507 0.0806* -1.75E-06 0.1071 
Ireland -0.037149 0.0000*** 1.23E-06 0.9781 
Italy 1.160757 0.0000*** 0.0001 0.6643 
Austria -0.02829 0.3924 7.81E-05 0.0313** 
Portugal -0.037976 0.0000*** 0.000296 0.0000*** 
Spain -0.033565 0.0000*** 0.000341 0.0000*** 
 
The Granger causality test show that the CDS premia precede the bond spreads in most of the 
countries. The Granger causality test for Belgium, Finland, Greece Ireland and Italy show an 
one way Granger causality whereby bond yield differentials are driven by the cds premia. In 
contrast, in cases of France, Portugal and Spain displays Granger causality in both directions. 
Only in the case of Austria the bond spreads cause the CDS premia. Overall, the results indicate 















 Hansen Parameter stability test 
 
 
The estimation period in his study covers a volatile period of the euro area. Therefore, it is 
important to check cointegration between the governmen5t bond yields and CDS spreads for 
structural breaks. Hansen (1992) proposes a test of the null hypothesis of cointegration against 
the alternative of no cointegration. Under the alternative hypothesis of no cointegration one 
should expect to see evidence of parameter instability. In this context, Hansen (1992) proposes 
the Lc test statistic to evaluate the stability of parameters. We present the results in Table 4.8. 
 






  Lc Lc 
Austria 0.86 (0.01) 1.67(0,01) 
Belgium  1.38 (0.01) 1.69 (0.01) 
Finland 6.21(0.01) 0.44(0.05) 
France 0.85 (0.01) 0.75(0.01) 
Ireland 0.55(0.03) 1.20 (0.01) 
Italy 0.43 (0.06) 0.71(0.01) 
Portugal 0.62 (0.02) 0.94(0.01) 
Spain 0.71 (0.01) 0.76 (0.01) 
Note: The probability of parameter stability is in parenthesis. Stable relationship is probability > 20%. We exclude 
the Greek CDS from this analysis because of the credit event on 9 March 2012. 
 
The results of the Hansen test show sign of instability. Our sample covers an unstable period 





Gregory and Hansen structural break test 
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In the absence of equilibrium in the system, standard cointegration tests could produce poor 
results. Therefore, we perform Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration test which allow for 
a endogenous structural break in the cointegration vector. We use three alternative models: a 
level shift (C), a level shift with trend (C/T) and a regime shift that allows the slope vector to 
shift model as well (C/S) 
 
 












Austria             
C -7.06(4.61)*** 27-Aug-2009 -7.88 (-4.61) *** 20-Aug-2009 -92.04(-40.48) *** 20-Aug-2009 
C/T -7.11(-4.99)*** 1-Mar-2013 -7.96 (-4.99) *** 20-Aug-2009 -92.86 (-47.96) *** 20-Aug-2009 
C/S -7.21 (-4.95) *** 20-Aug-2009 -8.08 (-4.95) *** 19-Aug-2009 -96.34 (-47.04) *** 19-Aug-2009 
Belgium             
C -6.62 (-4.61) *** 30-Apr-2010 -7.52 (-4.61) *** 5-May-2010 -90.00 (-40.48) *** 5-May-2010 
C/T -6.92(-4.99) *** 12-Apr-2011 -7.83 (-4.99) *** 11-Apr-2011 -98.37 (-47.96) *** 11-Apr-2011 
C/S -6.60 (-4.95) *** 30-Apr-2010 -7.50 (-4.95) *** 5-May-2010 -89.72 (-47.04) *** 5-May-2010 
Finland             
C -3.95 (-4.61) 26-Nov-2009 -3.35 (-4.61) *** 9-Nov-2009 -47.49 (-40.48)  9-Nov-2009 
C/T -4.22(-4.99) 15-Jul-2011 -3.71 (-4.99) *** 13-May-2013 -54.03 (-47.96) *** 13-May-2013 
C/S -4.25 (-4.95) 13-Jul-2011 -3.60 (-4.95) *** 9-Nov-2009 -46.36 (-47.04) 9-Nov-2009 
France             
C -7.01 (-4.61) *** 4-Jan-2010 -7.20 (-4.61) *** 4-Jan-2010 -96.12 (-40.48) *** 4-Jan-2010 
C/T -7.08(-4.99) *** 5-May-2010 -7.32 (-4.99) *** 5-May-2010 -96.99 (-47.96) *** 5-May-2010 
C/S -6.99 (-4.95) *** 4-Jan-2010 -7.24 (-4.95) *** 4-Jan-2010 -95.30 (-47.04) *** 4-Jan-2010 
Ireland             
C -7.04 (-4.61) *** 20-Jul-2011 -8.26 (-4.61) *** 18-Jul-2011 -88.42 (-40.48) *** 18-Jul-2011 
C/T -8.04 (-4.99) *** 20-Jul-2011 -9.59 (-4.99) *** 18-Jul-2011 -112.73 (-47.96) *** 18-Jul-2011 
C/S -8.77 (-4.95) *** 24-Jun-2011 -10.35(-4.95) *** 28-Jun-2011 -137.61 (-47.04) *** 28-Jun-2011 
Italy             
C -8.18 (-4.61) *** 30-Apr-2010 -8.93 (-4.61) *** 17-Sep-2014 -135.24 (-40.48) *** 17-Sep-2014 
C/T -9.02 (-4.99) *** 29-Mar-2011 -9.65 (-4.99) *** 28-Mar-2011 -156.65 (-47.96) *** 28-Mar-2011 
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C/S -8.33 (-4.95) *** 2-Aug-2012 -9.10 (-4.95) *** 24-Jan-2011 -140.44 (-47.04) *** 24-Jan-2011 
Portugal             
C -8.51 (-4.61) *** 28-Jun-2013 -9.95 (-4.61) *** 26-Jun-2013 -138.40 (-40.48) *** 26-Jun-2013 
C/T -8.54 (-4.99) *** 2-Jul-2012 -9.98 (-4.99) *** 12-Jun-2012 -139.28 (-47.96) *** 12-Jun-2012 
C/S -8.64 (-4.95) *** 2-Jul-2012 -10.08(-4.95) *** 13-Jun-2012 -141.76 (-47.04) *** 13-Jun-2012 
Spain             
C -9.81 (-4.61) *** 22-Aug-2012 -9.83 (-4.61) *** 21-Aug-2012 -157.36 (-40.48) *** 21-Aug-2012 
C/T -10.34(-4.99) *** 14-Sep-2012 -10.45(-4.99) *** 13-Sep-2012 -175.06 (-47.96) *** 13-Sep-2012 
C/S -10.28(-4.95) *** 14-Sep-2012 -10.35(-4.95) *** 13-Sep-2012 -172.21 (-47.04) *** 13-Sep-2012 
 
Table 4.9 presents the results of Gregory and Hansen test, showing clearly the evidence of 
cointegration is found even if we allow for a structural break. The test suggests that a structural 
break should be taken into account in the specification of CDS and bond yields spreads.  
 
A series of events that took place starting from 2009 could explain the results.  The period was 
marked by great turmoil for the euro area. The global financial crisis transformed into a 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, starting from Greece in 2009 and moving to Ireland in 
2010 and followed by Portugal a few months later.  
 
Following the period after the collapse of the Lehman Bothers the periphery yields started 
rising, while the 10-year German government bond yields moved in the opposite direction, a 
sign that the investors were moving to the safety of the German bonds. With the Greek bond 
yields increased by almost 15% at the end of 2009 and Greek debt at 130% of GDP, in May 
2010 Greek government and the EU/IMF agreed to an unprecedented (110 billion euros) three 
year aid package.  
In November 2010 with the Irish bond yields rising rapidly the Irish government agreed to a 
total amount of €85 billion bailout agreement with the EU and IMF to deal with the banking 
crisis. Moving on with the euro area timeline, on 17 May 2011 Portugal, followed by pressures 
in the government bond yields, agrees with the other Euro area members and the IMF to a 78 
billion bailout package. The Greek debt crisis continued to intensify in 2012 and in March 2012 
the Greek government agreed to a second bailout package amounting to €130 billion, followed 






This study investigates the presence of unit root, cointegration and causality tests to shed light 
on the relationship between the CDS premia and the government bond spreads for nine euro 
area (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain) countries from 
September 2008 until November 2015.  Both the CDS premia and bond spreads are measures 
of the sovereign risk.  
 
The sovereign CDS and the underlying bond offer similar exposure to the risk, therefore the 
basis, which is the difference between them, should be zero. However, since the onset of the 
global financial crisis and even more during the euro area crisis the no arbitrage relation has 
not held. The basis could be either positive or negative due to short-term relative value 
opportunities or long lasting ones. We perform this analysis in order to examine the relation 
between the 10 – Year CDS premia and bond spreads of eight euro area countries of fixed-
coupon government bond of the same maturity  over the German Bund. The results of our 
analysis indicate that a relationship between the two measures of sovereign risk is found in all 
countries apart from Austria.  
 
On analysing the causality the main evidence is that the CDS are better measures of the 
sovereign risk in periods of stress because they react more rapidly in changes in the markets. 
However, the aim of this paper is additionally to capture the relationship between the CDS 
premia and bond spreads in a period of turbulence of the euro area.  
 
The GH (1996) test suggests that the structural break in the cointegration vector is important 
and need to be taken into account in our analysis. In summary, the results indicate that the CDS 
premia and sovereign bond spreads are related to a certain relationship and that during the 







































Abstract: The aim of this study is to investigate the main factors causing the sovereign 
defaults. We use a panel of 99 countries to assess the impact that various macroeconomic and 
political risk indicators have on sovereign defaults on foreign currency bank loans, foreign 
currency bonds and local currency debt, utilizing an extended database constructed by the Bank 
of Canada. Our results suggest that the favorable economic indicators, lower debt levels and 
political stability all reduce the likelihood of default. We also find that the capital outflows 






5.1   Introduction  
 
Sovereign defaults are defined as a country’s failure to repay its debts. In case of such an event, 
the results for the defaulted country can be disastrous not only in the short term but also in the 
medium and long term as it will be difficult and expensive to borrow. During the last 35 years, 
sovereign defaults have become common.  . In Europe in the late 1980s several Eastern 
European countries (Romania, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia), experienced severe debt 
crises. The same decade In the 1980s,, the oil price shock caused widespread defaults in South 
America followed by the Mexican default in 1994 which affected other Southern American 
economies. Its impact is also known as the “tequila effect”.  Three years later the East Asian 
crisis, which started in Thailand, spread very quickly to Indonesia, Korea and other East Asian 
countries. Russia followed soon after (1998) and more recently Iceland (2008) and Greece 
(2012). In the case of Greece more specifically, in March 2012, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association announced that it has triggered a restructuring “credit event” under 
credit default swap contracts. Approximately 97 per cent of privately held Greek bonds took a 
53.5 per cent cut of the bond principal, about €107 billion reduction in Greece’s debt stock.  
Moody’s (2013) in an extended analysis of sovereign defaults records 24 such incidents since 
1997. Nine of the defaults were on both local and foreign currency government bonds, 8 were 
on local currency government bonds only and 7 affected foreign currency government bonds. 
At this point it should be stressed that these defaults have been observed at different debt levels.  
There are countries that have endured debt levels of more than 100% of GDP and have not 
experienced a default while others defaulted while maintaining lower debt levels. This suggests 
that other reasons besides economic factors play a role on the sovereign’s decision to default. 
An example would be the case of Hungary compared to Russia. Just after the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union, Hungary was on the verge of defaulting many times between the period 
of 1990 to 1994 while experiencing negative GDP growth. From fear on the impact of a default 
to the support that received from Western countries, it managed to find different ways to deal 
with this problem. On the other hand, Russia in 1998 decided to default. The use of the word 
decided was carefully chosen, as its government continued making domestic currency debt 
payments and only defaulted on foreign denominated bonds. Nonetheless, the examples 
demonstrated above show that a country can end up not repaying its debt either due to 
deteriorated economic fundamentals or due to political reasons.  Below is a graph from Bank 
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of Canada that depicts the sovereign debt in default by six creditors. The spike that is observed 
according to the Bank of Canada is attributed to Greece’s, Ireland’s and Portugal’s debt 
restructuring.  
     
Figure 5. 1 Total Sovereign Debt in Default, by Creditor 
 
Source: Bank of Canada 
 
What has led all these countries mentioned above to default? Are there any common 
characteristics with respect to their economies and politics? There is a large number of research 
papers, which attempt to explain the sovereign risk, observed sovereign bond yields and credit 
default swaps prices. Favero and Missale (2012) find evidence that the fluctuations in the euro 
area bond spreads are driven by fundamentals. In the line with the above, Di Cesare at al. 
(2012) suggests that the levels of sovereign bond yields after the global financial crisis reached 
levels that can be explained by fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals.  
In this paper we consider to which extent macroeconomic fundamentals and political indicators 
explain the sovereign defaults. We use the Sovereign defaults database (CRAG) constructed 
by the Bank of Canada, which includes defaults on debt in different subcategories of creditors; 
International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Paris 
Club, other official creditors, private creditors, foreign currency bank loans, foreign currency 
bonds and local currency debt, from 1960 until 2015. We analyse the effect of macroeconomic 
indicators for a set of 99 countries from 1985 until 2015 on sovereign defaults. Consistent with 
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the literature, we find evidence that the debt to GDP ratio and the real GDP growth volatility 
are statistically significant in explaining the sovereign defaults.  The innovation of this paper 
is that we also examine the explanatory power of indicators associated with the political risk 
on sovereign defaults. We incorporate four different indictors – the World Governance 
Indicators, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Polity IV and Economic 
Freedom- and find that the political risk captures a significant part in explaining the sovereign 
defaults.   
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we will review the relevant literature and then we 
will present the data and the method that we will use to examine the dependent variable. In the 
third section we will present and discuss the results. The final section will offer a summary of 
the paper and the concluding remarks.  
 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
There is a vast literature discussing sovereign defaults, their causes and determinants. Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981) were the first ones to separate between bankruptcy of an individual 
economic agent in a national economy and a default by a government. When it comes to 
sovereign defaults they distinguish their willingness to pay their debt and whether they can 
actually repay. It can be argued that the latter is dependent on the economic situation of the 
country whereas the former is more linked to political factors. In line with the above, Verma 
(2002) used both structural and political variables, to explore what affects a country’s decision 
to default. He concluded that political factors affect a sovereign’s decision to default using a 
multivariate probit model. More specifically, countries with more democratic regimes tend to 
default more than others.  
The literature thus examines both economic and political variables as possible determinants of 
sovereign defaults. We will firstly discuss papers that examine macroeconomic variables and 
then move on to the ones that investigate political factors and their effects.  To start with, 
Arellano and Kocherlakota (2014) attempt to investigate the link between domestic debt default 
risk and sovereign debt in 18 emerging markets. Using temporal and country specific evidence 
they found that domestic defaults result in sovereign defaults and that this relationship is not 
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causal. They argue that non-fundamental shocks lead to domestic defaults, which in turn result 
in fiscal pressures that may cause defaults on foreign loans.   
Catao and Sutton (2002), try to explain the variations in sovereign default probabilities by 
examining the role of macroeconomic volatility. They break down the latter into externally 
induced volatility, considering this to be linked to the trade, and policy induced volatility that 
is linked to foreign exchange, monetary and fiscal policies. Their sample consists of twenty-
five emerging economies over a period of thirty-one years from 1970 to 2001.  Their findings 
suggest that countries that demonstrated higher policy induced volatility are more likely to 
default. Sharp decreases of GDP growth and fiscal balances mostly precede these defaults as 
expected. However, they also find that there is a gradual deterioration of some other indicators, 
such as ratio of debt service to export.  
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) in their analysis of the determinants of sovereign risk find that 
the volatility of terms of trade has statistically and economically significant impact on 
sovereign yield spreads. As noted by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) any dollar revenues generated 
by the country’s trade activity could increase its ability to pay its external dollar denominated 
debt. Similarly, Eicher and Maltriz (2013) argue that the terms of trade are significant in 
explaining the sovereign risk because they affect the country’s ability to generate foreign 
currency revenues which can be used for foreign currency denominated debt. 
 
Bi (2012), introducing an endogenous and stochastic fiscal limit, which measures the country’s 
ability to pay its debts, argues that it relies on economic fundamentals, such as the fiscal policy, 
the size of the government, economic diversity and political uncertainty.  Baldacci et al. (2008) 
using a panel of 30 emerging market economies investigate the determinants of country risk 
premiums. Measured by the sovereign bond spreads they argue that the credit risk is driven by 
fiscal and political factorsfiscal and political factors drive the credit risk. 
 
 Beirne (2013) analyses the drivers of sovereign risk as expressed by the sovereign yields and 
sovereign credit default swaps, shows that deterioration in countries’ fundamentals has a 
significant impact on both of them. The linkage between the macroeconomic fundamentals and 
the sovereign credit risk is investigated for six euro area countries by Yahya et al (2013). They 
conclude that the creditworthiness of the studied countries is affected by macroeconomic 
fundamentals such unemployment, debt to GDP ratio and gross fixed capital formation.  
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Clark and Kassimatis (2015) using a new set of macroeconomic variables, which reflect 
investors expectations, find them significant in explaining and forecasting the sovereign credit 
spreads, expressed as proxy for the sovereign risk. According to Min (1998) inflation is another 
important factor in explaining the government borrowing cost for a sample of Asian and Latin 
American countries. On the contrary, Diaz and Gemmill (2006) who examine the factors 
affecting the creditworthiness of four Latin American economies find no connection between 
inflation and the sovereign risk as expressed by the government bond spreads.  
 
Defaults episodes are more likely to occur in periods of recession. Tomz and Wright (2007) 
investigating whether there is a relationship between sovereign defaults and economic activity 
in the defaulting country. Covering 169 defaults for 175 sovereign entities they conclude that 
62 per cent of these defaults occurred in periods of economic recession.  
 
Cantor and Parker (1996) exploring the criteria underlying sovereign ratings conclude that 
factors such as the GDP growth and GDP per capita income are statistically significant in 
explain the rating decision by two leading ratings agencies, Moody’s Investors Service and 
Standard and Poor’s. 
 
 In another study Mellios and Paget-Blance (2006) examine what are the factors that the three 
major rating agencies, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s consider when 
assigning their rating. Using a principal component analysis they find that the sovereign ratings 
are mainly determined by per capita income, government income, real exchange rate changes, 
inflation rate and default history.  
 
Similarly, Afonso et al. (2007) in a European Union focused empirical analysis over a period 
from 1995 to 2005 conclude that the GDP per capita, real GDP growth, government debt, 
government effectiveness, external debt and external reserves, sovereign default indicator as 
well as being member of European Union are the main indicators that the three largest rating 
agencies consider for the rating decisions. 
 
 In the body of literature, we found several papers trying to identify the determinants of 
sovereign defaults using variables that are indicators of defaults instead of using the variable 
per se. Below, we will provide an overview of the most interesting and relevant ones.  We will 
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start with Maltritz (2012) who uses a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in his attempt to 
identify the determinants of default risk in countries of the European Union.  
 
As an indicator for risk he uses government yield spreads in all EMU member states from 1999 
until 2009.  What he finds, after having tested various variables, is that government debt to 
GDP, budget balance to GDP and more specifically the deficit significantly affect the 
dependent variable.   
 
Alesina et al (1995), examined the borrowing rates and the debt of OECD countries. They find 
a significant relationship in both the sovereign yield spreads, which is often an indicator of 
default, and public debt in countries where the debt to GDP ratio is not stable. Lastly, another 
paper that uses an untraditional way to examine the sovereign default risk is the one of Alfonso 
(2003). Using data from S&P and Moody’s he tries to identify the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings. He argues that GDP per capita, external debt as a percentage of exports, inflation 
and real growth rate are significant in the determination of the credit ratings.  
Moving on to the literature focused on the political risk, Hatchondo et al. (2007), identify the 
political factors, borrowing costs and resources as the factors that determine whether a country 
will default or not, based on the existing literature.  
Empirical studies suggest that countries have greater probabilities to default in periods where 
the available resources in a country are low (Tomz and Wright (2007) and Cantor and Packer 
(1996)) and when borrowing costs for a country are high (Arora and Cerisola (2001) and 
Lambertini (2001)).  
 Finally, different political factors seem to play a role on whether a country will default or not. 
Political instability has been found statistically significant by Citron and Nickelsburg (1987) 
and Balkan (1992). The latter also reports that democracy plays a role in defaults. In line with 
that Kohlscheen (2003) finds that countries with parliamentary democracies have a lower 
probability of default than compared to countries with presidential systems. Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990) also show that political instability increases the probability of a default.  
In a bit more detail, Balkan (1992) examines if and how the level of democracy and political 
instability affect the country’s probability to repay its debt. The method adopted in the paper 
is a probit regression run in 33 countries over a period of 13 years, starting in 1971. The choice 
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of the countries was based on the criteria of them being developing nations with an external 
debt of hight that one billion dollars.  In line with others in the literature he states that 
democracy decreases the default probabilities whilst high level of political instability increases 
them. On the note of political stability, Manasse and Roubini (2005)) amongst other variables 
that have examined is whether a country has presidential elections in less than five years which 
is considered a sign of instability. Using a Classification and Regression Tree Analysis (CART) 
find that these countries have increased probability to default when international capital 
markets are tight.  
 
Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), in their attempt to test the interaction of political factors with 
defaults use a neoclassical open economy model. The model has two types of political parties, 
each period one of the two in power and foreign lenders. They also assume that the only asset 
traded in financial markets is a noncontigent one period bond. This bond is available only to 
ruling political. The results of the model reinforce the vast literature that politics play indeed a 
role in a sovereign’s likelihood to default. What they find is that unstable and more polarised 
economies lead in both higher default rates and volatility of interest rate spreads. 
 
Yu (2016) has also tried to understand whether political factors affect the probability of a 
country to default. He examines 68 countries, a mix of developed and emerging economies, 
from 1970 until 2010 using a panel logit model. What Yu argues is that apart from economic 
reasons, political associated variables play a role in a country’s probability to default. For 
example, Tabellini and Ozler (1991) report that when two types of government with multiple 
equilibria alternate in power, defaults are more probable.  
 
Also, Sapriza and Cuadra (2008) prove that a government can choose to default when election 
results are uncertain by taking excessive debt, as a preventive move. Coming back to Yu, his 
main findings suggest that political stability is a significant factor that determines this 
probability. More specifically, more democratic countries that are political stable will less 
likely default whereas higher chances of political turnover along with younger political regimes 
have the opposite effect.  
 
Baldacci et al (2011), focus on emerging markets only in their attempt to understand the 
determinants of sovereign defaults. They study bond spreads as a spike in them is translated as 
a higher probability to default. Their sample consists of 46 countries over a period of 11 years 
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from 1997 to 2008. They find that both political and fiscal factors affect the credit risk of these 
countries. More precisely, in periods of economic downturn the markets are less tolerant in 
institutional risk asking for an extra premium to lend them by increasing the spreads.  
 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2008) show that to explain defaults in both domestic and external 
obligations, the political institutions of a country should be examined.  Using a non- parametric 
technique, to exploit the advantage of identifying patterns in the data that this technique offers 
compared to a standard logit, prove that indeed political factors matter in defaults. For example, 
when economic fundamentals are sufficiently strong, democracies with a parliament system 
assure that a default on an external debt will be avoided. In dictatorships on the other side, 
assuming the same as above, high stability and tenure guarantee that the country will not default 
on its domestic debt. 
 
Finally, Eichler and Plaga (2016) take a different approach to the issue. They examine the links 
between sovereign bond holdings and political factors, as these can be an indicator of a default. 
They focus on US investors that hold bonds in 60 countries between 2003 to 2013. US investors 
seem to reduce their investment in bonds when there is political uncertainty. In cases, where 
the default risk is high or a country has already experienced one, they prefer to invest to country 
bonds with higher political constraints. However, when none of these two exist they prefer 


















5.3 Methodology and Data  
 
5.3.1    Data and Variables 
 
In our analysis, we use the Bank of Canada Sovereign defaults database constructed by Beers 
and Mavalwalla. Consistent with the literature and the rating agencies, Beers and Mavalwalla 
(2017) consider a default event has occurred when debt is service is not paid on the due date 
or within a specific time frame in any of the following circumstances13: 
 
• Agreements between governments and creditors that reduce rates and/or extend maturities on 
outstanding debt. 
• Government exchange offers to creditors where existing debt is swapped for new debt on 
less-economic terms. 
• Government purchases of debt at substantial discounts to par. 
• Government redenomination of foreign currency debt into new local currency obligations on 
less-economic terms. 
• Swaps of sovereign debt for equity (usually relating to privatization programs) on less-
economic terms. 
• Retrospective taxes targeting sovereign debt service payments. 
• Conversion of central bank notes into new currency of less-that-equivalent face value. 
 
 
GRAG’s sovereign database14 presents data for sovereign defaults from 1960 to 2016 for the 
creditors’ categories listed below: 
 
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
• International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
• Paris Club 
                                                 
13  Bank of Canada, Database of Sovereign Defaults 2015, page 2. 
14  Available at https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/r101-revised-june2017.pdf 
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• Other official creditors 
• Private creditors 
• Foreign currency bank loans 
• Foreign currency bonds 
• Local currency debt 
 
The analysis used in this paper is in line with the practices followed by credit rating agencies. 
Their method is based in measuring the probability of missed payments of the government and 
central bank bills, notes, bonds and bank loans, not the probability of missed payments of loans 
contracted from the IMF, the multilateral lending institutions and other official creditors. 
Moody’s Investor Services (2008) in a survey about the post-1960 history of sovereign defaults 
presents 38 case of sovereign bond defaults. Moody’s survey unveils that 45 per cent of defaults 
have been on foreign currency bonds, while 34 per cent affected local currency bonds and 21 
per cent were on a joint basis.  
  
We attempt to investigate the relationship between the sovereign default and the imposition of 
capital restrictions over a period of 20 years for 99 countries. To achieve this, we use the dataset 
of capital restrictions constructed by Fernandez et. al (2015). For the construction of the dataset 
Fernandez et al (2015) based on the methodology developed by Schindler (2009), but including 
more countries, more years and more asset categories.  The most important feature of this 
dataset is the fact that it disaggregates the information of the capital restriction on inflows or 
outflows. The sample covers the period 1985 to 2015 and the following ten asset categories: 
 
 
• Money market instruments, which includes securities with original maturity of one year or 
less. 
• Bonds or the other debt securities with original maturity of more than one year. 
• Equity, shares or other securities 
• Collective investment securities such as mutual funds and investment trusts. 
• Financial credit and credits other than commercial credits granted by all residents to 
nonresidents and vice versa. 
• Derivatives. 
• Commercial credits for operations linked with international trade transactions. 
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• Guarantees, Sureties and Financial Back-Up Facilities provided by residents to nonresidents 
and vice versa. 
• Real Estate transactions representing the acquisition of real estate not associated with direct 
investment. 
• Direct investment accounts for transactions made for the purpose of establishing lasting 
economic relations both abroad by residents and domestically by residents. 
 
The empirical investigation concentrates on explaining the sovereign defaults across a diverse 
set of countries and time range. To try to achieve that we use two different groups of variables; 
economic and political. The first group of variables that we use include several macroeconomic 
fundamentals. The debt to GDP ratio is a proxy used to determine whether a country can repay 
its obligation. A higher the debt to GDP ratio is associated with a higher probability of default. 
We also incorporate in our analysis the output volatility, as a proxy for the country’s capacity 
to absorb shocks and adapt to changes. In Figure 5.1 we calculated its average based on the 
countries in the analysis and we present the average per continents. The same for figures 5.2 to 
5.8 that follow. 
 
   
Figure 5. 2  General Government Debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
  
Real GDP growth (figure 5.2), which is defined as year on year percentage change of real GDP, 



















to default on its debts. We calculate the standard deviation of the real GDP growth rate over 4 
years of historical data, plus projected output over the next 3 years. Higher output volatility 
implies higher likelihood of default.  
 
 




We use the current account balance (as a percentage of GDP) (Figure 5.3 ) as a proxy for the 
country’s external solvency, which is linked with its level of external indebtedness. In the event 
of a sudden stop in financing, countries with large current account imbalances can be forced to 
undertake sharp macroeconomic adjustment.  Therefore, we expect the current account to have 
negative sign.  
 
 



















Another variable, which characterizes the country’s financing needs is the fiscal balance 
(Figure 5.5). A country with a stronger fiscal position should have less probability of default. 
Therefore, we expect this indicator to have a negative sign. 
 
































Moving on to the political variables, we will start with the International country risk guide 
(ICRG) (Figure 5.6). The ICRG reports three subcategories of risk: the political, financial and 
economic, which are updated monthly for 140 countries. For the above three, a separate index 
is created with a 100 points as a maximum for the political risk and 50 points for the other two. 
The scores to the indices are given by a business oriented model.  
 
The model quantifies a risk by examining country specific elements considering 22 variables.  
For the 22 variables 30 metrics are used to assess them. In this paper, we will only use the 
political risk index. This index comprises of 12 variables which exhibit both social and political 
traits.  Some examples are internal conflict, socioeconomic conditions, corruption and 
bureaucratic quality. These 12 then get points with the maximum ranging from 4 to 12 that 
attribute to the total of the 100 points.  ICRG is used as a proxy of political stability. 
 
     




The next variable that we thought might be worth to examine is democracy. Polity  IV (Figure 
5.7) is a research project that measures democracy from 1800 until present and it is commonly 
used in the political science research. We chose this data source as compared to other databases 
as polity provides data for a greater range of both years and countries. The database covers 167 
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to them ranges between -10 to 10. The two extremes represent hereditary monarchy and 
consolidated democracy respectively. From -10 to -6 autocracies , +6 to +10 democracies and 
the middle range from -5 to +5 anocracies.  
 
       




Another source of data widely used by researchers is the worldwide governance indicators 
(WGI) (Figure 5.8). WGI report both individual and aggregate governance indicators from 
1996 until 2015 (at the moment that this paper is written it has been announced that 2016 will 
soon be released) for over 200 countries. The way that authority in a country is exercised via 
its traditions and institutions is what defines governance. To measure it in every country, the 
following six dimensions, that are informed by 30 underlying sources are used: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality rule of law and control of corruption. In this paper, we use all six indicators, 
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The last index that we use to as an independent variable is the economic freedom index (Figure 
5.9). The Index has been created by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall street Journal yearly 
since 1995. It reports the relationship between economic freedom and various other positive 
economic and social goals in 186 countries. It is measured based on twelve freedoms that form 
four categories: the rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency and open markets. The 
index gets a score of a maximum 100 that is calculated by averaging the score that is given to 

























Figure 5. 9  Economic Freedom Index 
 
 
5.3.2   Empirical model 
 
The dependent variable, as mentioned in the previous section, is sovereign defaults. The values 
that it takes is 1 in case of a reported default in a country and zero otherwise. Since we are 
dealing with a binary variable, the most appropriate model to use is either a probit or a logit. 
The advantage of these two models compared to a simple linear OLS model is that they produce 
an S-shaped curve that respects the dependent variable boundaries of 0 and 1. The difference 
between them two is the assumption on the distribution of errors. Logit assumes that 
distribution is logistic whilst the probit that it is a standard normal distribution.    
 
As we have a panel dataset we need to account for any country specific effects leading us to 
use fixed effects (fe) model rather than random effects (re). To make sure that this is the best 
approach, we run a Hausman test which confirms that fe is the model we need to use (see table 
x for results). Debt and current account balance have been lagged one year as their impact is 
more likely to be visible a year after.  
 
In this paper we perform both probit and logit analysis in our sample. The intention is to better 
understand if and how both sets of variables affect the independent one. To begin with, in the 
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𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   (eq 2.11) 
 
 
where 𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖  sovereign defaults, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  debt to GDP ratio ,𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖   GDP growth volatility,   𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖  general 
government balance , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖current account balance  
 
Then we run all the regressions again with more than one macroeconomic variables but only 
one political variable at the time. (eq 5.2), (eq 5.3), (eq 5.4), (eq 5.5). 
 
                         𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   (eq 5.2)  , 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.3) 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.4) 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.5) 
where 𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖  sovereign defaults, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  debt to GDP ratio ,𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  GDP growth volatility, 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖   general 
government balance , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖current account balance and  𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 world governance indicators (eq 5.2), 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 is the international country risk guide (ICRG) (eq 5.3), 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  democracy as in polity IV (eq 
5.4),  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 economic freedom (eq 5.5) 
Finally, we add in the both sets of regressions the overall outflow restriction variable. once 
with only economic variables (eq 5.6) and then with one political variable at the time (eq 5.7), 
(eq 5.8), (eq 5.9),( eq 5.10) as above. All the regressions are firstly run with the fixed effects 
logit model and then the probit. 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.6) 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.7) 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   (eq 5.8) 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.9) 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.10) 
 
where 𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 sovereign defaults, 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 capital restriction outflow index, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 debt to GDP ratio, 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 GDP growth volatility, 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 general government balance , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖current account balance 
and  𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 world governance indicators (eq 5.7), 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 is the international country risk guide 
(ICRG) (eq 5.8), 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  democracy as in polity IV (eq 5.9),  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 economic freedom (eq 5.10) 
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5.3.3     Interaction term 
 
To expand and enhance the results we have decided to include an interaction term.  Its 
introduction in the regression will help in a better understanding of the explanatory variables 
and its effects on the dependent one. The interaction term is simply the product of two 
explanatory variables and its interpretation is the effect of one explanatory variable for different 
values of another explanatory variable. The interaction terms included in our regression is the 
product of one political variable with one political at a time, resulting in twenty regressions 
run. One example below is equation (eq 5.11). 
𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (eq 5.11) 
 
where 𝒴𝒴𝑖𝑖 sovereign defaults, 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 capital restriction outflow index, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 debt to GDP ratio, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 GDP 
growth volatility,  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖  general government balance,  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 current account balance,  𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  world 
governance indicators and 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 the interaction term of world governance indicators with the 
debt to GDP ratio 
 
Needless to say that the main effects are still thought the coefficients of the main variables.  
At this stage, a couple of things should be noted before demonstrating the results that will help 
us understand them better. Firstly, there are cases where the significance or the coefficients of 
the variables that form the interaction term give very different results to the main regression. 
The reason behind it is likely to be that when the term is included, the coefficient for the 
variable demonstrates its effect when the other variable of the term is zero also called the 
conditional effect.   
 
However, in a regression without an interaction term it shows its connection with the dependent 
averaged over all the levels of the rest explanatory variables. Secondly, apart from the 
coefficients the constant can also change. The change stems from the fact that the variables 






5.4 Regression Results 
 
5.4.1   Empirical Results 
 
In this section we will present the estimation analysis results. We will start by presenting and 
discussing the logit results with only the macroeconomic variables, then the ones with one 
political variable at a time but excluding the overall outflow restriction index and then the set 
of results when it is included.  
 
The analysis begins by examining the impact of the general government balance to GDP ratio, 
the GDP volatility, the one-year lagged debt to GDP ratio and the one-year lagged current 
account balance as a percentage to GDP. All the variables are positive and significant at the 1 
per cent level apart from the lagged current account balance that does not have any effect on 
the dependent variable. What the results indicate is that when debt, fiscal deficits and GDP 
volatility increase the probability of sovereign default increases.  
 
This is what we expected as deteriorated macroeconomic variables can result in a country’s 
inability to repay its debts and could lead in a default. However, we felt that maybe the effect 
of the current account balance result it is visible on the same year (Table 1). So we re-run the 
regression but this time with the variable not lagged. The results remain the same as before.  
 
The next step is to try and understand the effect of political variables on the defaults. As 
explained above, one political variable at a time will be used in conjunction with the 
macroeconomic variables. 
 
 A brief reminder of the variables that we use at this point will be useful:  Polity IV as a measure 
of democracy, the average World Governance Indicators, the overall economic freedom index 
and finally the international country risk guide index (ICRG). Increase in debt and GDP 
volatility in all four cases increases the sovereign default probability whilst current account 
balance (lagged or no) is insignificant.  When it comes to the fiscal balance to GDP ratio the 
results are not very consistent. The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP when the level of 
democracy and the ICRG are included, result in a significant and positive effect but once 
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overall economic freedom and the average of WGI are introduced it becomes insignificant. The 
political variables in all cases are significant and negative. Meaning that the higher is the level 
of democracy, the economic freedom, the WGI and the higher the political stability (higher 
ICRG) the lower the risk for a sovereign to default (Table 5.1). 
 
 
Table 5. 1  Sovereign Defaults and their determinants (Logit) 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 













































WGI   
-3.1446***  
(0.8073)       
Polity IV     
-0.1270***  
(0.0311)     
Economic Freedom       
-0.0800*** 
(0.0251)   




countries  45 38 45 45 86 
Number of 







Table 5. 2  Sovereign Defaults and the World Governance Indicators (Logit) 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Debt to GDP ratio (lagged) 0.0009***  (0.0000) 
0.0010***  
(0.0002) 

































































(0.7319)           
Regulatory 
      
-1.4636***  
(0.4872)         
Control of Corruption 
      
  -1.1285* (0.6146)       
Rule Of Law           -2.1057***  (0.6439)     
Avg WGI             -3.1446***  (0.8073)   
PCA               -1.2651***  
(0.3227) 
Number of countries  38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 




In the regression we also add the overall outflow restriction index. The index has a significant 
positive effect on defaults, similar to debt to GDP ratio and GDP growth volatility. The current 
account balances, both lagged and current, are insignificant. Compared to before though the 
introduction of the restriction index changes the government balance to become insignificant.  
 
We then add the political variables and re run the model. The outflow restriction index is 
positively significant when we include ICRG, polity and the average WGI; only at the 10% 
significance level in the latter. It is insignificant however when the overall economic index is 
included. Debt to GDP ratio, GDP growth volatility and current account (current or lagged) 
balance as a percentage of GDP behave the same as before; the first two increase the probability 
of a sovereign to default whereas the third has no effect. The last one when it comes to the 
economic explanatory variables is the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP which is found 
insignificant in all cases. Lastly, all the political variables apart from the level of democracy 
have negative significant effects on defaults (Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5. 3  Sovereign Defaults and the Political Indicators and Capital Controls 



































General Gov Balance 
























 -2.4913***  
(0.8959)       
Polity IV 
    
-0.0426  
(0.0477)     
Economic Freedom 
      
 -0.0649**  
(0.0273)   
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ICRG         
-0.0406***  
(0.0136) 
Number of countries  39 38 39 35 32 
Number of observations 734 681 734 648 575 
 
 
All the results that were reported above seem to have similarities. Debt to GDP ratio and GDP 
growth volatility were always found to be positively significant something that we have 
expected, whereas the current account balance, either current or lagged, did not have any effect 
on the defaults whatsoever.  The general government balance as a percentage of GDP gives 
very inconsistent results. It is positive and significant in the cases where in the regression we 
have only the macroeconomic indicators and in the ones where polity and ICRG are included. 
In all other cases, both including the outflow restrictions or not is insignificant. To continue, 
when the overall outflow restrictions index increases, the probability of sovereign default 
increases every time except for the time that in the regression the overall economic freedom 
index is included. In that case the explanatory variable becomes insignificant. Finally, all the 
political indicators have a negative impact on sovereign defaults apart from the level of 
democracy that loses its significance when the overall outflow restriction index is included.  
 
In order to deal with multi-collinearity problems between the World Governance Indicators we 
use the Principal Components Analysis (PCA)15. PCA can be used to reduce the dimension of 
a data set and extract the significant information from the table. In Table 3 we have computed 
the new variables, namely principal components, which are the lineal combinations of the 
original variables. 
 
As we can observe from Table 5.4 the Component (1) explains 86.38 per cent of the total 
variance. Moreover, the scree plot of the eigenvalue suggests that Component (1) is higher than 





                                                 
15 The principal component analysis is performed using STATA. 
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Table 5. 4  Principal Component Analysis 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
     
Comp1 5.1825 4.84471 0.8638 0.8638 
Comp2 0.337797 0.052224 0.0563 0.9201 
Comp3 0.285573 0.177195 0.0476 0.9676 
Comp4 0.108378 0.0629611 0.0181 0.9857 
Comp5 0.0454165 0.00508507 0.0076 0.9933 







5.4.2    Robustness check 
 
The robustness of the results is an important issue. To ensure that the results are robust, we run 
the same regression using the probit model now instead of the logit and we also introduce the 
interaction terms, as was discussed in the methodology section. Finally, using a three year 
 
 138 
moving average for debt, we run the logit regression again to examine whether the results will 
change. 
 
5.4.3    Probit Regression 
 
Using the same variables and running exactly the same regressions as above we find that the 
results do not differ from before. The only change that we can report is that the overall outflow 
restrictions from a 10% significance level become insignificant when the WGI is included. 
(Table 5.5 and 5.6). 
 
Table 5. 5  Sovereign Defaults and the Political Indicators (Probit)  
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debt to GDP ratio 
(lagged) 
 0.0006***   
(0.0001)  
0.0005***   
(0.0001)    







0.0022**      
(0.0004) 
0.0018 ***   
(0.0005)  
 0.0020***  
(0.0004) 




General Gov Balance 
























 -2.2444***   
(0.2456)        
Polity IV 
    
 -0.0748***  
(0.0162)     
Economic Freedom 
      
-0.0664***  
(0.0139)   




Number of countries  99 98 95 93 86 







Table 5. 6  Probit: Sovereign Defaults and the Capital Controls 
















0.0004***    
(0.0001)  
0.0005*** 
(0.0001)   





 0.0020 ***  
(0.0005) 




0.0026***   
(0.0005)  
 0.0016***  
(0.0006) 
General Gov Balance 
-0.0001  
(0.0001) 
-0.0001   
(0.0001)  
-0.0001   
(0.0001) 








-0.0001    
(0.0001)   
0.0001  
(0.0001)  






-2.1465***   
(0.2662)        
Polity IV 
    
-0.0297  
(0.0237)      
Economic Freedom 
      
-0.0584**    
(0.0149)    
ICRG         
-0.0325***  
(0.0001) 
Number of countries  98 98 94 93 85 




5.4.4     Interaction term results 
 
To understand better the effect of the political explanatory variables to sovereign defaults we 
introduced the interaction term. The interaction terms are formed using one of the economic 
variables, apart from the current account balance that is always insignificant, along with one 
political indicator at a time. We then run all the regressions again and discuss the results below. 
Before we move to the presentation of the results it is worth reminding that from the tests above 
we find that, all the political variables had a negative effect whereas all the economic variables 




The first term created contains the overall economic freedom index. When it interacts with the 
GDP volatility and the fiscal balance, is negative, but when with the debt is insignificant. This 
means that the political variables have a stronger effect on defaults than GDP volatility and 
government balance but not stronger than debt. The World Governance Indicators and the 
economic stability (ICRG) generate very similar results. Both their impact is stronger, when 
interacting with the GDP volatility, as the term has a negative sign, but not with debt and 
government balance where it is insignificant. Finally, the effect of the level of democracy is 
lower than debt, as we find the term to be positive and no effect with the rest. The same 
procedure as above was followed again with the addition of the overall outflow restrictions. 
What we find is that only the overall economic freedom index has a stronger effect compared 
to overall outflow and all the rest are insignificant. In Table 5.7 the combination of the columns 
with each row represent the interaction terms.  
 
Table 5. 7  Logit interaction term results 

































Kao Index 0.5736 
(1.2449) 
0.1371  













5.4.5    Three-year moving average on debt 
 
Finally, we test how the variables behave when instead of using one year debt lagged, we use 
its three year moving average. Table 5.8 and 5.9 depict the results of the logit regression when 
excluding and including the outflow restriction index respectively. 
 
Table 5. 8  Logit Regression using a three year moving average on debt 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3 years moving average Debt to 
GDP ratio 




  0.0660 ***       
(0.0097) 
0.0356***           
(0.0054 ) 
Volatility 
0.0022**    
(0.0010) 




0.0018**            
(0.0009) 
General Gov Balance 
 -0.0002    
(0.0002) 
0.0004***   
(0.0001) 
  -0.0002  
(0.0002) 
0.0002         
(0.0001) 
Current account lagged 
 -0.0003      
(0.0002) 
0.0001     
(0.0002) 
 -0.0002          
(0.0002 ) 






    
Polity IV 
  





    




      
  -0.0906***          
(0.0142) 
Number of countries 38 45 35 37 
Number of observations 720 1233 685 956 
 
What we can observe from the table above is that the results are the same as before with the 
debt having a positive significant impact on defaults whereas all the political variables a 







Table 5. 9  Logit Regression using a three year moving average on debt including kao 
Sovereign Defaults (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Kao Index 
 0.8206     
(0.9372) 
  1.0767  
(0.8019) 
 0.2765    
 (0.9179) 
0.5346   
 (0.9304) 
3 years moving average Debt to 
GDP ratio 









0.0023**   
(0.0010) 
0.0018*      
(0.0009) 
0.0027***   
(0.0010 ) 
0.0012          
(0.0011 ) 
General Gov Balance 
 -0.0002      
(0.0002) 
 -0.0002      
(0.0002) 
-0.0002      
(0.0002) 
 -0.0002       
(0.0002) 
Current account lagged 
 -0.0003       
(0.0002) 
 -0.0001       
(0.0002) 
-0.0002       
(0.0002) 
0.0003         
(0.0003) 
WGI 
-1.8285**   
(0.8602) 
  
    
Polity IV 
  





    




      
 -0.0342***  
(0.0128) 
Number of countries 38 39 35 32 
Number of observations 720 776 685 576 
 
However, the introduction of the three year moving average on debt, instead of the lagged debt 
seems to weaken the impact of the capital restriction outflow index where it becomes 
insignificant. On the political indices side, the only change compared to before is the economic 











5.5 Conclusions  
 
The purpose of our empirical investigation is to analyze the determinants of the sovereign 
defaults. We employ a panel of 99 countries using annual data over the period 1985 – 2015. 
Our analysis is based on the Bank’s Credit Rating Assessment Group (CRSG) default’s 
database constructed by the Bank of Canada.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature not only by examining the impact of both 
macroeconomic and political indicators on the sovereign defaults, but emphasizing on the 
quality of the political institution and the capital controls. 
 
Our results indicate that the sustainability of a government’s debt is a fundamental 
consideration in sovereign risk analysis. Higher debt ratio might be interpreted by the market 
participants as a warning signal about the country’s future ability to repay its debts. The default 
risk is also positively affected by the fiscal imbalances. We show that higher fiscal deficits are 
associated with increased likelihood of default. We also incorporate the real GDP growth 
volatility in our analysis and provide evidence that increased output volatility weakens the 
government ability to repay its outstanding debt obligations. As a measure of country’s external 
solvency and its ability to generate foreign revenues, we introduced in our empirical analysis 
the current account balance as a percentage of GDP. The results indicate an insignificant 
relationship between the current account and the incidence of sovereign defaults. We can argue 
that the current account imbalances (deficits) do not necessarily imply higher risk, as well-














Table 5. 10 Summary of findings 
 
 
However, we believe that sound macroeconomic fundamentals are not the only factors to assess 
a country’s creditworthiness. Therefore, four different political indicators are included to 
investigate the effect of political risk on sovereign defaults. We use the International Country 
Risk Index, the Polity IV, the average WGI and the economic freedom index. We find that 
these are all significant in explaining the probability of sovereign defaults. This is consistent 
with the results of Yu (2016) and Hatchondo et al. (2007) who also conclude that the political 
stability, as measured by higher level of democracy and freedom, together with consistent 
political regime lowers the probability of default.  
 
Another contribution of our research is that we incorporate in our analysis a new dataset of 
capital control restrictions on outflows constructed by Fernandez et al. (2015). This dataset 
includes an extended sample of countries, years and asset categories on both capital controls 
on inflows and outflows. We find evidence that the capital controls outflows index is positively 
associated with the sovereign defaults with the macroeconomic fundaments remaining 
statistically significant. This is in contrast with Moody’s Investor Services (2008) survey on 
Sovereign defaults and Interference, which finds that deposit freezes occurred outside of 
government defaults and therefore the relation between deposit controls with sovereign 
defaults is not perfect. Further work could explore in more depth the association between the 






6 Appendix A5 
 
The countries use in the analysis are presented in the table below 
Countries 
Algeria Ethiopia Malaysia South Africa 
Angola Finland Malta Spain 
Argentina France Mauritius Sri Lanka 
Australia Georgia Mexico Swaziland 
Austria Germany Moldova Sweden 
Bahrain Ghana Morocco Switzerland 
Bangladesh Greece Myanmar Tanzania 
Belgium Guatemala Netherlands Thailand 
Bolivia Hong Kong SAR New Zealand Togo 
Brazil Hungary Nicaragua Tunisia 
Brunei Darussalam Iceland Nigeria Turkey 
Bulgaria India Norway Uganda 
Burkina Faso Indonesia Oman Ukraine 
Canada Islamic Republic of Iran Pakistan United Arab Emirates 
Chile Ireland Panama United Kingdom 
China Israel Paraguay United States 
Colombia Italy Peru Uruguay 
Costa Rica Jamaica Philippines Uzbekistan 
Cote d'Ivoire Japan Poland Venezuela 
Cyprus Kazakhstan Portugal Vietnam 
Czech Republic Kenya Qatar Zambia 
Denmark Korea Romania   
Dominican Republic Kuwait Russia   
Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic Saudi Arabia 
Egypt Latvia Singapore   
El Salvador Lebanon Slovenia   
 
 146 
7 Appendix A6 Sovereign Defaults 
 
Countries
Algeria 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2012
Angola 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Argentina 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bangladesh 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bolivia 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Brazil 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bulgaria 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004
Burkina 
Faso 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Chile 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Colombia 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Costa Rica 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
C™te 
d'Ivoire 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cyprus 2013
Dominican 
Republic 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Ecuador 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Egypt 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
El Salvador 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Ethiopia 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Georgia 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Ghana 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Greece 2012 2013
Guatemala 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2013
Hungary 2009
India 1992 1993




Iran 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2011 2012 2013
Jamaica 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Kazakhstan 1993 1994 1995 1998 1999
Kenya 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Korea 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Kuwait 1990 1991
Kyrgyz 
Republic 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Lebanon 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mauritius 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mexico 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Moldova 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Morocco 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Myanmar 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Nicaragua 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Nigeria 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2013 2014
Pakistan 1989 1990 1991 1992 1998 1999 2001
Panama 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Paraguay 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Peru 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Philippines 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008
Poland 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Portugal 2013
Romania 1986 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Russia 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Slovenia 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
South Africa 1985 1986 1987 1989 1993
Sri Lanka 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2013 2014
Swaziland 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Tanzania 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Thailand 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Togo 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Tunisia 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2013
Uganda 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Ukraine 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Uruguay 1985 1986 1988 1990 1991 2003
Uzbekistan 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Venezuela 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Vietnam 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2008 2010





































This thesis investigates the main drivers of the sovereign risk during the euro area debt crisis, 
focusing on the determinants of the sovereign bonds yields and credit default swaps. The main 
conclusions of this thesis could be summarized as follows. 
 
First, in Chapter 2, we attempt to explain the driving factors of the sovereign bond spreads of 
ten euro area countries. We find that macroeconomic variables such as the debt to GDP, real 
GDP growth, fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP and the unemployment rate are consistently 
significant in explaining the government bond yield differentials. The announcement of the 
Outright Monetary Transaction by the European Central Bank in August 2012 was significant 
effort to calm the markets and increase the liquidity and confidence in the euro area markets. 
Therefore, we propose the OMT variable in our model to capture the effect that had in the 
sovereign bond spreads.  
 
The empirical results confirm that after its introduction the bonds spread started to fall 
substantially. Moving on, we re-examine the determinants of the sovereign spreads by splitting 
our countries into two different sub groups, the core euro area countries; Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France and the Netherlands, and the periphery countries; Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. We find that the OMT dummy variable has no impact on the core countries, 
while on the periphery is highly significant. Another interesting finding is that the effect of the 
debt to GDP ratio is more than twice larger in the periphery countries compared to the core 
countries.  
 
Another contribution of our research is our attempt to explain the impact of several events, 
which took place during the crisis period on the sovereign bond spreads. The events taken 
under consideration are the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy and the bailout packages provided 
to Greece (2010 and 2012), Ireland (2010) and Portugal (2011). Our findings show that apart 
from the second bailout package provided to Greece, all other dummy variables are significant 
with positive, indicating that there are other factors not reflected in the economic fundamentals 
that we control for, which drove up the bond spreads. Finally, and to capture the effect of the 
non-macroeconomic variables, we incorporate in the analysis the World Governance 
Indicators. We calculate the average of all six indicators and find that together with the debt to 
GDP ratio, the real GDP growth, the fiscal balance and the unemployment rate are significant 




Second, in Chapter 3, we re-examine the evolution of the sovereign risk during the euro area 
debt crisis but this time from a different angle and having incorporated more recent data. We 
investigate the factors affected the sovereign default swaps from October 2008 until December 
2014. We also differentiate in our methodological approach by using cointegration techniques. 
We find that the debt to GDP ratio is significant in driving the CDS spreads mainly in the 
periphery euro area countries; Ireland, Portugal and Spain. We also incorporate in our analysis 
the iTraxx indicator as a proxy for Europe-wide market sentiment. We show that the iTraxx 
indicator remains significant in all countries apart from France.   
 
We also use two different subgroups of countries, the core; Austria, Belgium, Germany and 
France and the periphery countries; Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain to find whether the 
explanatory factors have different impact on them. We show evidence that the debt to GDP 
ratio has a significant impact in the periphery countries while, loses its significance in the core 
countries. Interestingly, we notice that the real GDP growth has no impact for the periphery 
countries but remains significant in the core countries.  
 
Third, in Chapter 4 we investigate the relationship between the sovereign bond yields and the 
sovereign credit default swaps during the euro area crisis. We perform cointegration techniques 
and propose the introduction in our analysis of two structural break tests, Hansen (1992) and 
Gregory and Hansen (1996). We find that the CDS premia precede the bond spreads in most 
countries, with the exception of Austria, where the bond spreads cause the CDS premia. Our 
findings are in line with the literature (Fontana and Scheicher (2010), Blanco et al. (2005). We 
also find evidence of cointegration even if we allow for a structural break in our analysis.  In 
summary, our results indicate that the CDS premia and sovereign bond spreads are related to a 
certain relationship and that during the euro area crisis, price discovery took place in the CDS 
market.  
 
Fourth, in Chapter 5, we provide a more focused analysis of the sovereign risk by looking for 
actual sovereign default cases from a broad dataset constructed by the Bank of Canada. This 
time we expand our sample of countries by incorporating default cases from all over the world. 
The main contribution of our analysis is that we consider different political indicators to capture 
the impact they have on sovereign defaults. The model we propose incorporates four different 
sets of political risk indicators, the International Country Risk Index, the Polity IV, the World 
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Governance Indicators and the Economic Freedom Indicator. We find that all indicators 
together with a set of macroeconomic indicators are significant in explain the sovereign 
defaults, consistent with the results of Yu (2016) and Hatchondo et al. (2007). Another 
contribution of our research is that we also incorporate a new dataset of capital outflows 
restrictions constructed by Fernandez et al. (2015). We find evidence that the capital controls 
outflows index is positively associated with the sovereign defaults with the macroeconomic 
fundaments remaining statistically significant.  
 
This thesis in an attempt to provide a better understanding of the factors driving the sovereign 
risk as expressed by the sovereign bond yields and sovereign credit default swaps during the 
euro area debt crisis. We find that the deterioration of the macroeconomic fundamentals led to 
a sharp rise in the yields and CDS initially, but is not enough to explain the fluctuations during 
the crisis period.  
 
This thesis has several limitations. First, in Chapter 2, the use of additional political and social 
indicators could provide more accurate results on the impact they might have in explaining the 
sovereign risk. The constantly rising bond spreads and CDSs during the crisis period indicate 
that other factors, which are not captured by the macroeconomic fundamentals used in the 
analysis, were driving them upwards. In our analysis we seek to estimate the impact of the 
World Governance Indicators as an average. However, as these six indicators are correlated to 
each other it would be more appropriate to perform a principal component analysis.   
 
Another interesting point would be to investigate the impact of the fiscal policy measures 
announced by the European countries affected by the crisis and not only the impact of the 
bailout packages as we did in our analysis. In Chapter 3, the inclusion in our model of a non-
macroeconomic and financial indicator could generate interesting conclusions, however the 
limitation that exists in this case is a political indicator with high frequency data (monthly). 
Future work might examine the impact of political risk on the sovereign risk as measured by 
the sovereign CDS. In Chapter 4, we are focusing on the relationship between the sovereign 
bond spreads and CDSs during the crisis and for limited number of euro area crisis. Although 
the author believes that it covers this topic in a satisfactory and complete way, using advanced 




One of the main limitations is the number of countries used. Future work is needed to explore 
and further develop the findings on the relationship between these two measures of sovereign 
risk by including more countries in the analysis and in a longer period. Moving on, in Chapter 
5, our findings confirm the strong relationship between the sovereign risk and macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as the debt to GDP ratio and the real GDP growth.  
 
However, it fails to explain the relationship between the sovereign defaults and the external 
imbalances as measured by the current account balance as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, the 
introduction of other indicators such as the trade balance, the net international investment 
position or the share of global trade could be used in future research. Another interesting 
finding of our research that needs to be further investigated is the relationship between the 
capital outflows restrictions and the sovereign defaults. It may be useful to explore it by looking 
at it in a case-by-case basis, and find whether or not sovereign defaults were accompanying by 
restriction in capital outflows. To achieve a more comprehensive analysis, it would be also 
interesting to look at each case of sovereign defaults individually and investigate different 
country specifics or other qualitative factors that led to the default. Sovereign risk is complex 
and difficult to be measured, however the author hopes that this thesis covers a broad research 
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